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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Organizational Justice and Antidiscrimination
Despite eighty years of governmental interventions, the legal system has proven ill-equipped to address workplace discrimination. Potential plaintiffs are reluctant to file discrimination claims for a host of social and economic reasons, and the
relatively few who do file face steep structural barriers. This Article argues that the most promising way to curb workplace discrimination is not through amending statutes or trying to change
the behavior of individual bad actors; instead, we must modify
the workplace itself. Specifically, this Article argues that Organizational Justice—a theory empirically grounded in behavioral
science—provides novel guidance for how to proactively restructure workplace policies around the principles of fairness and equity. This Article further claims, based upon empirical evidence,
that Organizational Justice can do the work of antidiscrimination by: (1) decreasing discrimination in the first place, (2) moderating the effects of discrimination, and (3) increasing internal
reporting of harassment and discrimination. Finally, this Article
provides insights for how to design policies that promote both
actual justice and perceptions of justice in the workplace.
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Article

Organizational Justice and
Antidiscrimination
Bradley A. Areheart†
INTRODUCTION
Despite nearly eighty years of governmental attempts to
stamp it out, discrimination in the workplace has proven unrelenting.1 The news is littered with stories of xenophobia, misogyny, and racism.2 In addition to these clear examples of explicit
† Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For helpful conversations and astute insights regarding various iterations of this article,
I would like to thank Blair Bullock, Jessica Clarke, Katie Eyer, Adam Feibelman, Joseph Fishkin, Michael Higdon, Ann Lipton, Jessica Roberts, Sandra
Sperino, and Daiquiri Steele. I would also like to thank the law faculties at Louisville and Tulane, where I presented earlier versions of this article. I am especially grateful for help from my talented research assistants: Katelyn Dwyer,
Dave Hall, Benjamin Merry, and Grant Williamson. Final thanks goes to the
hardworking editors at Minnesota Law Review. Copyright © 2020 by Bradley A.
Areheart.
1. The governmental effort to address employment discrimination can be
dated as far back as the executive order FDR signed in 1941 to prevent defense
contractors from discriminating on the basis of “race, creed, color, or national
origin.” Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1938–1943).
2. See, e.g., DeNeen L. Brown, Allegations of Racism That Divided a Maryland Town Remain Unresolved, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/allegations-of-racism-that-divided-a-maryland
-town-remain-unresolved/2019/01/04/df042c48-049f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_
story.html [https://perma.cc/BGG8-ATTA]; Sam Dean, Allegations of Sexism
and Harassment Roil Riot Games, the Developer of ‘League of Legends,’ L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/
la-fi-tn-riot-games-culture-20181014-story.html [https://perma.cc/QXE2
-5XTH]; Lauren Hepler, Menial Tasks, Slurs and Swastikas: Many Black Workers at Tesla Say They Faced Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/business/tesla-factory-racism.html [https://perma.cc/
W2R9-QK6H]; Douglas Jacobs, We’re Sick of Racism, Literally, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/opinion/sunday/sick-of
-racism-literally.html [https://perma.cc/8P5L-BX6J]; Silicon Valley’s Sexism
Problem, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/
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bias, we also know more than we once did about implicit bias3
and the way in which it can, for example, predict racial disparities in employment.4 In nearly every industry there are striking
imbalances in professional achievement along protected class
lines.5 Such incongruities suggest that, in the American work experience, a person’s success is impacted by forces beyond just
hard work. One reason for that has been the shortcomings of antidiscrimination law.6 The last decade has spawned an extensive
amount of legal and social science research that helps explain
the failure of such laws and discrimination’s persistence.
Legal scholars have responded to the failures of employment
discrimination law by proposing changes to these laws—often
04/15/silicon-valleys-sexism-problem [https://perma.cc/2QUC-YSAA]; Heidi
Stevens, It’s Official: 2016 Is the Year of Xenophobia, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 29, 2016,
11:53 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/heidi-stevens/ct
-xenophobia-word-of-the-year-balancing-1129-20161129-column.html [https://
perma.cc/GJH4-5878].
3. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1164–65 (1995) (arguing that many biased employment decisions
are cognitive, rather than motivational, in origin); see also MAHZARIN R. BANAJI
& ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 34–
52 (2013) (detailing findings of the Implicit Association Test).
4. See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the
Criminal Courtroom, 126 YALE L.J. 862, 876 (2017) (“[A] meta-analysis of
122 implicit bias studies found evidence that implicit racial biases predict racial
disparities in employment and healthcare.”).
5. See, e.g., Katherine T.U. Emerson & Mary C. Murphy, Identity Threat
at Work: How Social Identity Threat and Situational Cues Contribute to Racial
and Ethnic Disparities in the Workplace, 20 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 508, 512–13 (2014) (identifying racial disparities in highstatus positions in Fortune 100 companies, among others); Karen I. FredriksenGoldsen et al., Support of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Content in
Social Work Education: Results from National Surveys of U.S. and Anglophone
Canadian Faculty, 47 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 19, 25–27 (2011) (identifying gender
discrimination in the field of social work); Aasim I. Padela et al., Religious Identity and Workplace Discrimination: A National Survey of American Muslim Physicians, 7 AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 149, 149 (2016) (identifying religious
identity discrimination among medical practitioners); Damon J. Phillips, Organizational Genealogies and the Persistence of Gender Inequality: The Case of
Silicon Valley Law Firms, 50 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 440, 440 (2005) (identifying gender
disparities in Silicon Valley law firms); Ming-Te Wang & Jessica L. Degol, Gender Gap in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM): Current Knowledge, Implications for Practice, Policy, and Future Directions, 29
EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 128 (2017) (identifying gender disparities in science,
engineering, technology and mathematics education and workplaces).
6. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal reforms that would enable more plaintiffs to survive
summary judgment motions and reach the trial stage.7 These approaches are understandable, and even laudable. However, in
light of the compelling evidence showing that people are generally unwilling to attribute workplace outcomes to discrimination,8 it stands to reason that neither judges nor legislators are
likely to view discrimination as widespread enough to justify implementing such reforms.9 There are other challenges too, such
as many legislators’ commitment to protecting business interests and the difficulty of achieving the political will needed for
any major action in the realm of antidiscrimination law.10 Unsurprisingly, most legal scholars advocating legislative or interpretive reform are quick to acknowledge the political difficulty of
actually achieving such reforms.11 Moreover, even if antidiscrimination laws were construed to give plaintiffs better odds of
reaching trial, the psychological account of discrimination attrib7. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism
in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
CAL. L. REV. 997, 1061–62 (2006) (proposing courts employ psychological science
when considering the consequences of doctrinal decisions); Sandra F. Sperino,
Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 115 (2011) (advocating
abandoning current frameworks in Title VII cases); Charles A. Sullivan, The
Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV.
191, 238 (2009) (arguing courts should allow comparator proof as an alternative
to the McDonnell Douglas framework); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the
Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (advocating for courts to interpret antidiscrimination statutes consistent with their transformative objectives).
8. This general tendency is discussed in greater depth in Parts I.A.1–2.
9. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1330 (2012).
10. One example of this dynamic is found in the oft-proposed, never-passed
“Employment Non-Discrimination Act,” which would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Some version
of this statute has been introduced in almost every Congress since 1974, but
even when the Democrats have had control, it failed to pass. Employment NonDiscrimination Act, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employment_
Non-Discrimination_Act [https://perma.cc/N8CQ-ETRZ] (last updated Jan. 10,
2020). Or consider the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
which did eventually pass, but took thirteen years, during which all of “the controversial provisions were either deleted, revised, or clarified.” Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the Future of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5 (2018).
11. E.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 168 (2017) (acknowledging the
“difficult, if not impossible” prospects for Congressional reform of antidiscrimination law).
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ution casts doubt on whether decision-makers would ultimately
resolve critical questions of fact in a way that benefits plaintiffs.12
The law is positioned largely to react to discrimination—not
to prevent or even reduce it.13 But legal recourse is a distant second to the ultimate goal: preventing discrimination in the first
place. Surprisingly, workplace policy measures that might seem
beneficial for prevention—such as antibias training, limiting
managerial discretion in hiring, and harassment reporting
mechanisms—are failing and, in some cases, are actually worsening bias.14 An increasing number of scholars have observed the
limited potential to effect norm change in the workplace through
legal or policy coercion.15 Well-intentioned strategies like diversity or antibias training may have the perverse effect of actually
12. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1331–32 (“If, however—as the findings of psychology scholars suggest—most people are predisposed to minimize the likelihood of discrimination, the ‘close calls’ are likely to predominantly be made in a
manner unfavorable to discrimination litigants. Over time, the accretive nature
of the law means that results—even if originally bolstered by a particular doctrinal reform—will ultimately come to resemble roughly the state of affairs that
we currently face, with discrimination litigants facing extremely difficult
odds.”).
13. TRISTIN K. GREEN, DISCRIMINATION LAUNDERING: THE RISE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOCENCE AND THE CRISIS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LAW 47–48
(2017) (showing how employer liability revolves largely around a system of
“complaint and response”).
14. See, e.g., LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 155–56 (2016) (observing that symbolic
structures can “mask” discrimination by creating an illusion of fairness);
GREEN, supra note 13, at 112–13 (observing that “diversity trainings can reinforce stereotypes,” “trivialize discrimination,” “engender anger,” and reduce the
numbers of women and minorities in management); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra
Kalev, Why Diversity Programs Fail and What Works Better, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July–Aug. 2016, at 55 [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail] (“Trainers
tell us that people often respond to compulsory courses with anger and resistance—and many participants actually report more animosity toward other
groups afterward.”); Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Why Doesn’t Diversity
Training Work? The Challenge for Industry and Academia, 10 ANTHROPOLOGY
NOW 48, 49–51 (2018) [hereinafter Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge]
(“[T]rainees often leave ‘confused, angry, or with more animosity toward’ other
groups.”).
15. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95
VA. L. REV. 1893, 1903 (2009) (suggesting aggressive legal strategies may backfire when it comes to implicit bias); Eyer, supra note 9, at 1279–80 (noting proposals to broaden the legal doctrines of antidiscrimination laws may “exacerbate
the documented tensions between prevailing public views and available
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activating stereotypes and increasing “moral licensing,” a phenomenon in which doing something positive allows one to worry
less about subsequently doing something negative.16 Trainings
for diversity or harassment can also undermine people’s senses
of “autonomy, competence, relatedness, and basic goodness”—
causing such programs to backfire.17 There has been a leap in
logic from understanding discrimination as a problem to assuming the prevailing treatments will succeed; but “[u]nderstanding
the cause of malaria and understanding its treatment are two
different things.”18 What is needed to address the situation today
are less coercive, empirically-verified approaches to inequality.
This Article argues that one promising way forward is found
in the principles of Organizational Justice, a body of literature
that stems from equity theory.19 Organizational Justice emphasizes moral propriety regarding how employees are treated.20 Its
founders have defined it as “the extent to which an aspect of the
organizational environment is perceived as fair, according to a

claims”); Lisa Legault et al., Ironic Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions Can Reduce (But Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 1472, 1476 (2011) (demonstrating “that strategies urging people to comply
with antiprejudice standards are worse than doing nothing at all” and that “social control elicited a reflexive, reactive effect that increased prejudice”).
16. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 49–51 (showing
antibias training can activate and reinforce stereotypes, as well as increase
“moral licensing,” which can in turn make workers less likely to self-censor and
more likely to act badly).
17. Bartlett, supra note 15, at 1961; see also infra notes 282–84 and accompanying text (explaining in detail why diversity programs are prone to fail).
18. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the
Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV.
589, 591 (2006); see also Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1472 (observing “[p]olicymakers in North America spend billions of dollars annually on prejudice interventions, yet very few of these are actually based on sound evidence”).
19. Equity theory generally posits that judgments of inequity or injustice
derive from comparing oneself to others based on the ratio of “inputs and outcomes.” Organizational Justice, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Organizational_justice [https://perma.cc/3LEV-FTTV] (last updated Jan. 6,
2020). For more discussion of equity theory and related theoretical models for
better understanding Organizational Justice, see Kjell Törnblom & Ali Kazemi,
Distributive Justice: Revisiting Past Statements and Reflecting on Future Prospects, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE 15, 26–29 (Russell
S. Cropanzano & Maureen L. Ambrose eds., 2015).
20. See Russell Cropanzano et al., The Management of Organizational Justice, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 34, 34 (2007).
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certain rule or standard.”21 The field of Organizational Justice is
generally thought to sub-divide into three sets of work-related
concerns: (1) what people receive (distributive justice); (2) the
standards, rules, and processes under which people receive (procedural justice); and (3) how people are treated along the way
(interactional justice).22 Ultimately, Organizational Justice is
not concerned with positive or negative outcomes at work, but
rather with whether the outcomes or treatments are fair.23 Organizational Justice asks whether members of an organization
have been treated justly and whether they have received what
they deserve.24
More specifically, it is the position of this Article that Organizational Justice can do the work of antidiscrimination.
When workers feel their organization is unfair, they are likely to
feel resentful or envious, producing “action tendencies”25 that

21. Carolina Moliner et al., Challenges for an Organizational Justice Research Agenda, in ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
AND CONCEPTUAL ADVANCES 1, 1 (Carolina Moliner et al. eds., 2017).
22. Id. Interactional justice is often further divided into interpersonal justice, which concerns the treatment of employees by supervisors or managers,
and informational justice—a concern characterized by the “quality of information employees obtain from communications with their supervisors or managers.” Yoon Jik Cho & Na Sai, Does Organizational Justice Matter in the Federal Workplace?, 33 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 227, 230–31 (2012).
23. Russell S. Cropanzano & Maureen L. Ambrose, Organizational Justice:
Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 3, 3–4.
24. Organizational Justice was first developed as a focus of academic inquiry in the 1980s and has since grown into a robust field of research. See Jerald
Greenberg, A Taxonomy of Organizational Justice Theories, 12 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 9, 10–15 (1987) (categorizing fields of research that have informed organizational justice as a field); infra note 48 (listing recent anthologies devoted to
organizational justice).
25. See NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 71 (1986) (“Emotions are action
tendencies. More fully: Emotions are tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment.”); James J. Gross & Ross A. Thompson, Emotion Regulation: Conceptual Foundations, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION
REGULATION 3, 5 (James J. Gross ed., 2007) (“[E]motions not only make us feel
something, they make us feel like doing something.”); see also Eric A. Posner,
Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1979–84 (2001) (describing the role
of emotions and how they produce action tendencies).
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make workers more likely to discriminate,26 sexually harass others,27 and engage in unethical practices as a way to “right” their
perceived wrongs.28 The most direct way that Organizational
Justice advances nondiscrimination goals is through changing
the workplace climate, which can help prevent both discrimination and harassment. Additionally, when policies are structured
to be just, they have the potential to excise the subjective (and
often discriminatory) components of decision-making.29 Instead
of centering on individuals—the focus of most failing antidiscrimination efforts—Organizational Justice targets the organization. Enhancing justice in the workplace can also help prevent
retributive motives from taking shape and manifesting as discrimination.30 Moreover, increasing justice perceptions can
26. Niels van de Ven et al., Leveling Up and Down: The Experiences of Benign and Malicious Envy, 9 EMOTION 419, 426 (2009) (discussing how unchecked envy, when it arises in an unjust environment, can drive discrimination
or harassment against others); Robert P. Vecchio, It’s Not Easy Being Green:
Jealousy and Envy in the Workplace, 13 RES. PERSONNEL HUM. RESOURCES
MGMT. 201, 205–06 (1995) (same).
27. There is empirical evidence showing men who feel treated unfairly by a
supervisor at work are more likely to sexually harass other employees. Franciska Krings & Stéphanie Facchin, Organizational Justice and Men’s Likelihood
To Sexually Harass: The Moderating Role of Sexism and Personality, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 501, 507 (2009) (demonstrating perceptions of organizational
injustice increased sexual harassment); see Anne M. O’Leary-Kelly et al., Sexual
Harassment as Aggressive Behavior: An Actor-Based Perspective, 25 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 372, 375–77, 384–85 (2000) (observing perceived injustices may
lead one to sexually harass as a means of pursuing retributive justice); see also
SABOTAGE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: ANECDOTES OF DISSATISFACTION,
MISCHIEF, AND REVENGE (Martin Sprouse ed., 1992) (chronicling the way in
which emotions such as envy can lead to harassment).
28. Shai Davidai & Thomas Gilovich, The Headwinds/Tailwinds Asymmetry: An Availability Bias in Assessments of Barriers and Blessings, 111 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 837 (2016) (observing that feeling injustice
at work can cause people to “cut corners” or “engage in ethically questionable
practices” to obtain the benefits obstructed by obstacles); Julia J. Lee & Francesca Gino, Envy and Interpersonal Corruption, in ENVY AT WORK AND IN ORGANIZATIONS 347, 353 (Richard H. Smith et al. eds., 2017) (noting envy can help
“rationalize one’s unethical actions toward others”); Christopher M. Sterling et
al., The Two Faces of Envy: Studying Benign and Malicious Envy in the Workplace, in ENVY AT WORK, supra, at 57, 73 (observing that malicious envy may
cause people to “morally disengage”).
29. Infra notes 201–06 and accompanying text.
30. Infra Parts II.B–C (discussing studies); see also Zinta S. Byrne & Russell Cropanzano, The History of Organizational Justice: The Founders Speak, in
2 JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3, 3–22 (Russell Cropanzano ed., 2001) (discussing the evolution of organizational justice theories).
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catalyze internal reports of harassment, which can further deter
discrimination.31
Organizational Justice offers the benefit, over many current
policy efforts, of being an indirect (i.e., non-identity-conscious)
means of achieving antidiscrimination. Identity-conscious reforms often engender controversy and feelings of exclusion
among majority group members, both of which can impede social
norm change.32 Further, the kinds of policies that Organizational Justice warrants enjoy stronger empirical and scientific
support than most Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies.33 Finally, as the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements have
illustrated, justice can be a powerful framing device.34 As the
work of both sociologists and legal scholars has shown, people
are receptive to arguments voiced in the register of fairness.35
The breadth of a justice frame can thus facilitate coalition building.36 By contrast, advancing antisubordination values through
a protected class frame is a perpetual challenge: there are identity politics with which to grapple,37 and a limit to how much

31. Andrea M. Butler & Greg A. Chung-Yan, The Influence of Sexual Harassment Frequency and Perceptions of Organizational Justice on Victim Responses to Sexual Harassment, 20 EUR. J. WORK & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL.
729, 747–50 (2011) (arguing perceptions of procedural justice predict reports of
sexual harassment).
32. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 49–50.
33. By “Equal Employment Opportunity,” or the more frequently used
EEO, I usually refer to the policies, practices, or offices that are the outgrowth
of a cottage industry that sprung up in the 1970s to help companies avoid running afoul of antidiscrimination laws. FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 10–11 (2009); see also infra Part III (discussing effective forms of
organizational justice).
34. Cf. Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice,
2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 50–53 (describing the impact of the #MeToo movement).
35. See Eyer, supra note 9, at 1347 (discussing research on employees’ “expansive beliefs” on fairness in the workplace); infra Part I.A.2 (summarizing the
research on meritocracy beliefs).
36. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1358 (arguing that extra-discrimination remedies, such as just-cause legislation may “allow the building of broad coalitions
around a single movement for change”).
37. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990) (writing about “the dilemma of difference” in which “[t]he stigma of difference may be recreated both by ignoring and
by focusing on it”); Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique
of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 57 (Wendy
Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (writing about the “double bind” for identity
politics: on the one hand, wanting to have others recognize one’s identity as
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support individuals will give to civil rights causes.38 Advocating
for more just organizations with specific policy recommendations
in tow may be precisely the broad advocacy strategy needed to
target organizations and further antisubordination values in a
way that is both politically and socially palatable.39
Organizational Justice is particularly needed given the failings of antidiscrimination law. There has been a well-documented proliferation of judge-made rules and doctrines that
work against plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases.40
Some of these are procedural, such as heightened pleading
standards,41 more stringent class action requirements,42 or mandatory arbitration agreements.43 Other rules are substantive,
such as those requiring a plaintiff to prove she is a member of

unique and distinctive, but on the other hand, needing to “make valid generalizations about social groups” while avoiding demeaning or inaccurate stereotypes).
38. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING
ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 175–76 (2008) (analyzing the limited goodwill for civil rights causes); cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–49 (2011) (discussing “pluralism anxiety”).
39. While this might sound like a version of interest convergence—whereby
the interests of a subordinated minority must converge with majority group concerns—the reality is that antidiscrimination efforts require social buy-in and
support in order to achieve lasting social change. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment,
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 518, 524 (1980).
40. Infra notes 41–45.
41. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–63 (2007) (sanctioning
new “plausibility standard” which requires plaintiffs to show that claims are
legally viable and factually plausible); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684
(2009) (applying new plausibility standard to all types of civil claims). Empirical
work shows dismissal rates in Title VII cases rose sharply after this tandem of
cases was decided. EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 65–66.
42. ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 37–38 (2017) (explaining how courts
have increasingly required more factual substantiation from class action plaintiffs prior to certification); EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 68–70 (same).
43. See EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 63–65, 134 (explaining how mandatory
arbitration agreements are regressive for would-be employment discrimination
litigants); Joint Statement from Law Women’s Associations Regarding Mandatory Arbitration Agreements (Dec. 3, 2018), https://docs.google.com/document/d/
1nSU-Lif9AxXoKY1p8DSD_g7sn0TMXQFsvHv7uL2NlBs/edit [https://perma
.cc/C5LY-WFEL] (“Mandatory arbitration agreements prevent employees from
seeking justice in court and limit the enforcement of substantive employment
rights.”)
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the protected class44 or those allowing the judge to disregard evidence of bias.45 For the two percent of plaintiffs who ultimately
overcome these hurdles and prevail at trial, the wins are relatively modest46—and nearly half of those wins are later reversed
on appeal.47
Although Organizational Justice is an established and robust area of research,48 it has played only a minor role in legal
scholarship.49 Only a handful of legal articles have enlisted its
principles, and typically for limited purposes.50 Even within the
social sciences there has been very little effort to examine the
44. See Jessica Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101,
119–40 (2017) (exploring systematically the ways in which judges require that
employment discrimination plaintiffs prove their membership in a protected
class).
45. See generally SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11 (chronicling the various judge-made rules and doctrines, such as the same-actor inference or stray
remarks doctrine, that are used to disregard evidence of bias). These rules and
doctrines are discussed in greater depth in the “Dispositive Motions” section
below. Infra Part I.B.2.
46. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 13, 63 (discussing damages caps); see
also infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing monetary caps for individual lawsuits).
47. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103,
131 (2009) (observing, in a study that spanned seventeen years, that employee
trial wins were reversed more than forty percent of the time on appeal, where
only about nine percent of employer wins were reversed).
48. See, e.g., ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 21; JUSTICE IN THE
WORKPLACE, supra note 30; OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19.
49. For example, a search in Westlaw’s “Law Reviews & Journals” database
conducted on December 18, 2018 for “ATLEAST10(“organizational justice”)” returns only nine law review articles, five of which concern organizational justice
in the context of criminal law.
50. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 27 (enlisting organizational justice to
argue in favor of “due process rights designed to enhance worker voice and provide incentives for voluntary employer accommodation of caregiving”); Lisa
Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for
Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 37–40 (2008) (observing
that organizational justice is the primary frame through which dispute system
designs are evaluated, but arguing it is insufficient in that it does not address
“the actual, objective outcome”); John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White
Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 632–37 (2005) (positing organizational justice as one value that may conflict with a business person’s other legal and ethical obligations).
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relationship between Organizational Justice and workplace discrimination51 or harassment.52 As such, this Article’s chief contribution is to systematically consider how Organizational Justice might function as a tool of antidiscrimination.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of this Article
takes stock of the latest social science and legal research to provide a sweeping account of how employment discrimination law
and policy is failing victims. Considering the cumulative barriers
to securing legal recourse provides a unique vantage point for
understanding the uphill climb for would-be discrimination
plaintiffs. Part II systematically builds the case for Organizational Justice as a tool of antidiscrimination, exploring the relationship both in theory and in practice. There, I show how Organizational Justice has the potential to decrease discrimination
and sexual harassment, moderate the effects of discrimination,
and increase internal reporting. Part III then theorizes the hallmark values of policies that further Organizational Justice as
well as identifies specific approaches that can help advance fairness within the workplace. It also collects and criticizes the arguments against “new governance” approaches, in which organizations voluntarily self-govern in lieu of top-down regulation.
I. THE FAILURE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND POLICY
For decades, scholars have lamented the legal difficulties
faced by employment discrimination plaintiffs.53 New research
51. Stephen Wood et al., Discrimination and Well-Being in Organizations:
Testing the Differential Power and Organizational Justice Theories of Workplace
Aggression, 115 J. BUS. ETHICS 617, 618 (2013) (noting the literature has generally failed to consider how justice perceptions mediate workplace discrimination).
52. See Cristina Rubino et al., And Justice for All: How Organizational Justice Climate Deters Sexual Harassment, 71 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 519, 520
(2018) (observing that most social science studies on sexual harassment have
“focus[ed] on gender-related antecedents and fail[ed] to explore more general
organizational factors”). While the research within the social sciences drawing
a line between organizational justice and discrimination is nascent, it is compelling.
53. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006) (noting that the law is unlikely
to sanction discrimination that stems from implicit biases); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995)
(arguing Title VII is inadequate to address unconscious forms of bias); Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
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indicates, however, that the long odds faced by such plaintiffs
are even longer than previously thought.54 Here, I bring together
findings from a variety of disciplines to provide a sweeping account of how, at each stage, the law’s capacity to deter discrimination or give adequate recompense is thwarted. This Part proceeds chronologically, from the initial stage of rights
mobilization all the way to a fully litigated outcome. Most legal
scholarship is understandably focused on, at most, one or two of
the barriers outlined here.55 Moreover, legal scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the psychological impediments
to claiming antidiscrimination rights.56 But considering the cumulative psychological and doctrinal barriers to securing legal
recourse in one place provides a unique perspective on the challenges for victims of employment discrimination.

101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (noting discriminatory behavior often results from “cognitive or unconscious bias, rather than deliberate, intentional
exclusion”); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 993–95 (2005) (noting that even though
disparate impact liability is the most promising way of dealing with subtler
forms of bias, such litigation is more costly (primarily because of expert testimony) and expressly allows a defendant to justify any disparities). See generally
SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11 (discussing the varied flaws in employment
discrimination doctrine).
54. See generally BERREY ET AL., supra note 42.
55. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523–
47 (2018) (noting that “many courts have categorically excused, erased, or ignored evidence of biased remarks rather than considering their relevance on a
case-by-case basis”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse
Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and
Retaliation Claims: What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV.
623, 637 (2003) (“Neither the statutory language of Title VII nor current Supreme Court precedent justifies the onerous burden that lower courts are imposing on employees who are subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory treatment.”); Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of
Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Licensing of Bias, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2016) (“By providing employers with a
virtually irrebuttable defense to changes of discrimination in this context, the
same-actor doctrine converts this moral credential into a legal privilege to engage in bias, thus licensing workplace discrimination.”). But see SPERINO &
THOMAS, supra note 11 (offering a more sweeping account in their book-length
treatment).
56. The most thorough exploration by a legal scholar to date is Katie Eyer’s
article That’s Not Discrimination. Eyer, supra note 9.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3585389

2020]

ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE

1933

A. PEOPLE DON’T FILE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Traditionally, legal scholars have focused their efforts on the
procedure and doctrine of law, even though rights mobilization—
which is more sociological than legal in nature—is arguably the
most important stage for discrimination recourse. After all, if
people fail to see an act at work as illegal discrimination (or they
see it but will not file a claim), the most doctrinally aggressive
laws in the world cannot help. While it appears that employees
have become more willing to assert claims of sexual harassment
in the current social environment,57 most workers are still generally resistant to advancing claims of discrimination.58 In fact,
57. See, e.g., Associated Press, Kevin Spacey Apologizes After Joliet Native
Anthony Rapp Accuses Him of Sexual Advance, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/ct-anthony-rapp-kevin-spacey
-sexual-advance-20171029-story.html [https://perma.cc/F6K6-TQDR]; Brooks
Barnes & Cara Buckley, From Time’s Up to Inclusion Riders: Women Take
Charge at the Oscars, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/03/05/movies/women-oscars-me-too.html [https://perma.cc/B755-XAFR];
Joe Coscarelli, R. Kelly Faces a #MeToo Reckoning as Time’s Up Backs a Protest,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/arts/music/r
-kelly-timesup-metoo-muterkelly.html [https://perma.cc/JQC9-LFES]; Sheryl
Gay Stolberg et al., Al Franken To Resign from Senate Amid Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/
politics/al-franken-senate-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/V85M
-QZFK]; Will Graves, Gymnast McKayla Maroney Alleges Sexual Abuse by Team
Doctor, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/
breaking/ct-mckayla-maroney-larry-nassar-metoo-20171018-story.html
[https://perma.cc/WF5J-FJTE]; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment
-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/LWH7-RRY2]; Stephanie McCrummen et
al., Woman Says Roy Moore Initiated Sexual Encounter When She Was 14, He
Was 32, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/woman-says-roy-moore-initiated-sexual-encounter-when-she
-was-14-he-was-32/2017/11/09/1f495878-c293-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story
.html [https://perma.cc/5NFZ-REZY]; Stephanie Zacharek et al., Person of the
Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME (Dec. 6, 2017), https://time.com/time
-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/4958-JRKH].
58. See infra Parts I.A.3–4. The evidence that relates to actual charges filed
is mixed. There is some evidence that rates of federal antidiscrimination lawsuits are declining. For example, over a 12-month period ending in March of
2003, nearly 21,000 civil rights employment cases were filed. SPERINO &
THOMAS, supra note 11, at 143. That number declined to 12,665 over the same
period in 2013. Id. It is hard to know exactly what to make of this. Charge statistics from the EEOC over a 20-year period have remained fairly steady. See
Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC), FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
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one recent study estimated that 1 in 100 possible African American grievants files a charge with the EEOC and just 13 in 10,000
file a federal lawsuit.59 This Section argues that potential plaintiffs do not file claims for four reasons: (1) their disbelief of discrimination; (2) their belief in meritocracy values; (3) their fear
of retaliation; and/or (4) their fear of poor outcomes.
1. Disbelief of Discrimination
People are unlikely to believe that discrimination is the culprit for any particular outcome at work. In particular, most people have a narrow mental paradigm of what constitutes discrimination.60 As we confront ambiguous situations in life, we assess
these situations through a type of mental shortcut: by comparing
these new situations with existing mental templates of potential
explanations.61 For example, if someone is denied a job promotion and the reason for the denial is not straightforward, the person could hypothesize that the reason was discrimination, merit,
nepotism, or a personality clash. In order to settle on a reason,
that person would likely compare the facts of the situation to existing prototypes of discrimination, merit, nepotism, or personality conflicts. “The process of making judgments thus becomes
one of comparing salient features of an existing template and the
situation currently demanding interpretation, and judging the
extent of similarity.”62 Templates vary from person to person, of
course, but most people’s templates of discrimination are quite
narrow, requiring strong evidence of invidious intent and clear
harm before they will attribute a result to discrimination.63
Thus, outside of exceptional circumstances, people are unlikely
to identify discrimination as the cause of a workplace outcome.
Another reason that people disbelieve discrimination as the
cause for any particular outcome at work pertains to the high
visibility of EEO policies found in the modern workplace. Such

enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/T7HP-M5WC]. So, the decrease in
lawsuits filed could indicate that people are experiencing less reasonably actionable discrimination (unlikely), that people are simply less willing to pursue
justice through the courts (more likely), or something else with an administrative explanation.
59. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264.
60. See generally Eyer, supra note 9.
61. Id. at 1312–13.
62. Id. at 1312.
63. Id. at 1330.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3585389

2020]

ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE

1935

policies have the potential to signal that the employer is generally nondiscriminatory. Employment policies such as affirmative
action, antiharassment policies, or diversity training have proliferated over the last fifty years and are now ubiquitous.64 These
policies have been termed “structurally symbolic civil rights.”65
Such policies symbolize an organization’s good-faith efforts to
avoid discrimination and comply with statutory mandates—regardless of whether such policies are actually effective in helping
racial minorities or women achieve good outcomes at work.
These policies can thus inadvertently keep people from exercising their rights by causing some employees to see an organization as affirmatively nondiscriminatory, even when the facts
don’t bear that out.66 This perception, in turn, weakens the likelihood that employees will take formal action to redress perceived violations of antidiscrimination laws.67 These structures
also lower the possibility that plaintiffs’ lawyers will take on a
particular lawsuit because judges and juries are less likely to
find that discrimination occurred when such structures are present.68
2. Belief in Merit
Connected to people’s tendency to disbelieve narratives of
discrimination is the fact that, when tasked with analyzing employment decisions, people tend to believe explanations that emphasize talent over other possible explanations. There is evidence that “the overwhelming majority of Americans” subscribe
to meritocracy beliefs, which makes them more likely to understand discrimination as aberrational.69 Two very thoughtful
books published since 2014 take aim at a pure notion of talent or
64. The reasons for this proliferation are beyond the scope of this Article,
but are comprehensively explored in DOBBIN, supra note 33.
65. EDELMAN, supra note 1441, at 216 (arguing that “we live not in a postcivil rights society but rather in a symbolic civil rights society”).
66. See, e.g., id. at 157 (detailing a series of experiments that, taken cumulatively, “show that the presence of symbolic structures in organizations causes
most people to view organizations as fair, irrespective of actual injustices, inequalities, and discrimination”); Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’
Rights Consciousness and the Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 84 (2005) (examining rights at work in a grievance procedure and concluding that “women complain about only the most serious or
most troubling forms of sexual conduct”).
67. EDELMAN, supra note 14, at 161.
68. Id. at 38; accord BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264.
69. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1304.
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merit: Joseph Fishkin’s Bottlenecks and Robert Frank’s Success
and Luck.70 While it is tempting to view outcomes as part nature,
part nurture, Fishkin believes that all behavioral outcomes are
100 percent nature and 100 percent nurture.71 Neither is a sufficient causal mechanism; neither does any work by itself.72
Fishkin seeks a more pluralistic model of opportunities, in part
because of his philosophical orientation that there is “no such
thing as ‘natural’ talent or effort, unmediated by the opportunities the world has afforded us, which include our circumstances
of birth.”73 Similarly, Frank notes that it is both one’s genes and
one’s environment that determine how smart one is, which in
turn informs whether one is likely “to perform well at the tasks
rewarded most lavishly by society.”74 But the factor that bears
most on workplace success is who one’s parents happen to be—a
fact for which no one can rightly take credit.75 There are a host
of specific advantages (or disadvantages) that parents pass along
to their children, and in the end, this is a fundamental constraint
on equal opportunity.76 Indeed, the correlation between parents’
income and their children’s later income is approximately the
same as the correlation for height.77 A robust critique of merit—

70. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014); ROBERT H. FRANK, SUCCESS AND LUCK: GOOD FORTUNE AND THE
MYTH OF MERITOCRACY (2016).
71. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 95.
72. Fishkin offers an illustration: The conventional understanding of nature/nurture is that each contributes to the person separately, in the way that
two people, say Billy and Suzy, might partly fill a bucket with water. One might
ask about Billy and Suzy’s contributions to the bucket of water and the answer
might be that Billy is 60% responsible, while Sally provided 40% of the water.
Fishkin says natural and environmental forces are, rightly understood, much
more synergistic and offers a revised picture: Suzy brings the hose and Billy
turns on the water. Now, the question of how much of the filled bucket is due to
Billy and Suzy, respectively, makes little sense. The bucket of water is due 100%
to both of their unique and complementary contributions. Id. at 95–96.
73. Id. at 83.
74. FRANK, supra note 70, at 8.
75. Id. (“[I]f you want to be smart and highly energetic, the most important
single step you could take is to choose the right parents. But if you have such
qualities, on what theory would it make sense for you to claim moral credit for
them? You didn’t choose your parents, nor did you have much control over the
environment in which you were raised. You were just lucky.”).
76. FISHKIN, supra note 70, at 48–56 (discussing incisively “the problem of
the family” as it relates to equal opportunity).
77. FRANK, supra note 70, at 8 (citing economist Alan Krueger).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3585389

2020]

ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE

1937

which is developed by both Fishkin and Frank, and has been previously advanced by esteemed philosophers such as Ronald
Dworkin—seems like it would cause many to moderate their beliefs about deservingness.78 Meritocracy beliefs persist, however,
and there are at least three reasons why.
The first reason is perhaps the most obvious: people overplay effort and downplay chance because it makes them look
more impressive. The academic explanation for this phenomenon is that people seek to manage their image in such a way that
others will attribute their successes to internal traits, such as
talent or perseverance, and attribute their failures to external
factors, such as sickness or death in the family.79 For example,
someone running a race would likely prefer that an impressive
time be attributed to her ability or grit; conversely, if she does
not run the race well, she might say the course was particularly
difficult. People who are the most successful are thus psychologically primed to rationalize their success as the inevitable byproduct of hard work.80 Even when no one else is watching, it is
more internally palatable to credit successes to one’s own industriousness rather than to chalk them up to fate or foul play.
The second reason is slightly less obvious, but centers on the
notion that merit and results often have a high degree of correlation. Those at the high end of the economic food chain are almost invariably driven and talented.81 This strong correlation
can cause people to believe that talent alone drives success.82
The people who are in the news for having succeeded are usually

78. Dworkin argues that it is unjust for people to have less means when it
is due to “brute bad luck.” RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 347 (2000). He further claims “[i]t is bad luck to be
born into a relatively poor family or a family that is selfish.” Id. Luck, according
to Dworkin, includes “what might be thought to be matters of identity as well
as accidents that happen once identity is fixed, and the situation and properties
of one’s parents or relatives are as much a matter of luck, in that sense, as one’s
own physical powers.” Id. He enlists these characterizations in part to argue in
favor of a “system of tax and welfare provision” based on a counterfactualized
insurance market, in which people could theoretically purchase insurance to
preemptively hedge against the risk of inequality of resources. Ronald Dworkin,
Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 107–09 (2002).
79. Edward R. Hirt et al., Self-Reported Versus Behavioral Self-Handicapping: Empirical Evidence for a Theoretical Distinction, 61 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 981, 981 (1991).
80. FRANK, supra note 70, at xiv.
81. Id. at 67.
82. Id. at 66–68.
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gifted and ambitious. CEOs are unusually shrewd, famous actors are exceptional thespians, professional athletes are able to
accomplish amazing feats with their bodies, and so on. In short,
many people harbor meritocracy beliefs because much of what
they see in the media or in their own personal lives is meritocracy-confirming. What is less visible, however, is the role of
luck—as embodied in the families to which people were born or
the geographic location in which they grew up. Thus, the enormous number of driven and talented people who were not lucky
enough—by way of genes or environment—to find success remain hidden from public view and largely unconsidered.83
A third reason that people subscribe to meritocracy beliefs
is hidden in plain sight: because sustaining these beliefs is fundamentally adaptive. There is robust evidence that downplaying
luck through a belief that only talent and effort matter leads to
better outcomes.84 For example, in one study, students were
much more likely to persist with difficult academic tasks if they
harbored strong meritocracy beliefs.85 If one’s worldview of success centers on talent and effort, then one may naturally be motivated to work hard, which in turn makes success more likely.
In this way, people might be strict adherents to meritocracy beliefs in part because it is instrumentally useful, which also
makes it more likely that such beliefs will survive and pass to
the next generation.86
3. Fear of Retaliation
Fear of retaliation is perhaps the most obvious reason that
people choose not to file discrimination claims, and such fears
are justified. One study found that two-thirds of employees who

83. See id. at 151–57 (showing through simulations the way in which luck
plays a critical role in whether talented people achieve material success).
84. Id. at 69–78.
85. See Bernard Weiner, Attribution Theory, Achievement Motivation, and
the Educational Process, in ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION AND ATTRIBUTION THEORY 185 (Bernard Weiner, ed. 1974) (showing that internal attributions, such
as ability or effort, rather than external ones, such as luck, suits one better for
future successes).
86. FRANK, supra note 70, at 73–77 (observing a Darwinian flare to meritocracy beliefs by acknowledging that “[p]arents who teach their children that
luck doesn’t matter may for that very reason be more likely to raise successful
children than parents who tell their children the truth”).
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spoke up against workplace mistreatment faced some form of retaliation.87 As a result, every antidiscrimination law features
antiretaliation provisions, which are intended to ensure that employees cannot be fired for lodging a complaint.
Even though legal protection for retaliation is built into antidiscrimination laws, it is far from adequate. Specifically, those
who complain internally are not protected from retaliation unless they can show their belief of illegality was objectively reasonable.88 While it may sound sensible to require that grievants
limit their complaints to conduct which is reasonably understood
as illegal, the law of employment discrimination often does not
track with lay understandings of discrimination or harassment.89
The fear of retaliation, coupled with the complexity of discrimination law, can erode the adequacy of legal protections. If
an employee complains too early, the conduct may not yet be severe enough to be objectively illegal; but if they complain too late,
it may vitiate their legal claim either by falling outside of the
limitations period or by allowing the employer to invoke the affirmative defense that the employee failed to utilize its internal
investigation process.90 Doctrines such as the same-actor infer87. See Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 (2003) (noting that only 34% did not experience retaliation in response to speaking up against sexual harassment or
incivility).
88. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001); see Deborah
L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 83 (2005) (“Since Breeden, courts
have required plaintiffs bringing retaliation claims under the opposition clause
to demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying conduct
amounted to unlawful discrimination.”).
89. Studies have shown that employees frequently overestimate the employment protections afforded to them by law. Alex B. Long, Retaliation Backlash, 93 WASH. L. REV. 715, 730 (2018) (citing Rachel Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Reasonable
Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1558 & n.236 (2014)).
90. The Supreme Court established a two-part affirmative defense by
which employers may insulate themselves from liability for harassment that
does not result in a tangible employment action. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Under the first part of the defense, an employer must prove it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior.” Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 765. An employer will typically meet this requirement by having in
place an “effective internal investigation process that” is set up to address complaints of harassment. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation
Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L.
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ence,91 stray remarks doctrine,92 and adverse action doctrine93
further increase the likelihood that an employee could mistakenly believe certain conduct violates the law.
But even if plaintiffs were fully versed in the law and the
law was more protective than it is, fear of retaliation would likely
remain a significant consideration for employees. Many employers would still retaliate and, just like with the issue of discrimination, the goal is to prevent retaliation—not only give proper
recourse. Moreover, there are many forms of low-level retaliation, e.g., managers or other co-workers are no longer friendly
toward you, that are not actionable,94 but matter quite a bit to
most people.
4. Fear of Poor Outcomes
One final reason people do not report discrimination is that
they decide the costs of doing so exceed the benefits. One prime
benefit is a material recovery from the employer. But the odds of
“winning” discrimination claims are bleak.95 Many fail to exhaust their administrative remedies, which in the context of an
employment discrimination claim means filing a complaint with
the EEOC or an equivalent state agency within the requisite
time period, giving the agency sufficient notice of the claim and

REV. 931, 952 (2007). To satisfy the second part of the defense, an employer
must show that the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
91. Under this inference, courts resist allegations of discrimination if the
alleged discriminator is the same person who made the original hiring decision.
See Quintanilla & Kaiser, supra note 55 (discussing same-actor inference in article-length treatment); see infra note 147 and accompanying text.
92. Under this doctrine, courts exclude words or statements that could be
used to show bias if they are unrelated to the employment decision, too remote
in time, or too ambiguous. See Clarke, supra note 55 (discussing stray remarks
doctrine in article-length treatment); infra note 148 and accompanying text.
93. Under this doctrine, actions are often not considered serious enough to
be actionable as discrimination. Actions that are often not considered serious
enough include giving an employee negative evaluation, assigning additional
work, or even threatening to fire a worker. See infra note 149 and accompanying
text.
94. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining the adverse action doctrine, under which courts often judge retaliatory actions that fall short
of termination as not serious enough to be actionable under employment discrimination law).
95. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
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time to investigate, and ultimately receiving a “right to sue” letter.96 Unless all of these requirements are met, a plaintiff does
not have standing in court.97 Additionally, the odds of finding an
attorney to take an employment discrimination case are long.98
One result is that about one-fifth of all such plaintiffs proceed
pro se, which impairs the chances of success.99 Even assuming
one finds an attorney willing to take the case, the old model of
going to trial against the company and prevailing in a way that
puts the pinch on a big corporation is outdated. Just six percent
of employment discrimination cases make it to trial, and only in
one-third of those cases does the plaintiff prevail.100 In the two
percent of filings in which a plaintiff ultimately succeeds at trial,
the award is “typically about $150,000.”101
A rational person will also assess the costs of bringing a discrimination claim. The costs are far more certain than any benefits and come in many forms. Chief among the costs is the possibility of social backlash. The psychological literature shows
that coworkers tend to denigrate those who complain of discrimination, even when there is evidence that the claim is true.102
96. Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N https://eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm [https://perma.cc/4T6W-A78U].
97. Id.
98. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264 (“Our interviews with plaintiffs’
attorneys reveal that they take only about one in ten cases for which they are
approached.”).
99. Id. at 68 (observing one in five plaintiffs litigates pro se).
100. Id. at 61 fig.3.4. The 6% is actually a fairly rosy finding. In one of the
most comprehensive studies of employment discrimination suits (all federal
cases from fiscal year 1970 to 2001), the authors found a steady decline in employment discrimination claims reaching trial, culminating in 3.7% for 2001.
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 438 (2004).
Another study from the Southern District of New York over four years (1997–
2001) showed an employment discrimination trial rate of 3.8%, with a plaintiff
win rate at trial of 33.6%. See Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J., 56, 56–57 (2003). A more recent study,
focused only on the District of Maryland between 2007 and 2008, found employment discrimination plaintiffs reached trial in less than 2% of cases. Charles A.
Brown, Note, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in the District of Maryland,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1247, 1259 tbl.1 (2011) (showing bench trials at 0.73% and
jury trials at 1.17% of all outcomes).
101. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264.
102. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim: The Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227, 234–36 (2003). Reporting discrimination may
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Workers who sue are also often vilified by their employers and
sometimes badmouthed more widely within the industry.103 A
multi-decade, qualitative study of discrimination plaintiffs
found that litigation imposes a “high personal cost,” with many
of the litigants experiencing one or more of the following as byproducts of their lawsuit: joblessness, depression, alcoholism, or
divorce.104
Finally, even if employees do eventually decide to file a
claim, it may be too late. Employment discrimination laws have
“internal limits” that require claims to be filed with the EEOC
or a similar state agency within 180 or 300 days105—a short
deadline when compared to the limitation periods for tort or contract claims.106 Similarly, once the EEOC has worked through
the charge and issued a “right to sue” letter, the plaintiff has
only 90 days from then to file in court.107 Any employee will naturally require time to mull the potential consequences of filing a
legal claim, but by the time they have considered all of them, the
limitations period may have run. Employees may also be reluctant to bring claims while still employed, for fear of poisoning
the well or encountering interpersonal hostility. But after being
terminated, it is usually too late to go back and complain about
earlier years of problematic decisions and treatment.108
also put one’s coworkers in the position of having to give information or testimony they may not want to give.
103. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 19, 265.
104. Id. at 266. They open their book with the example of a “successful” employment discrimination litigant. This plaintiff sued his employer for racial harassment, settled his claim for $50,000, and even won back his job. Statistically
speaking, he “won.” But he also suffered many harms. Tensions from the lawsuit led to a divorce; he felt cheated by the settlement; he paid 20% of the settlement to his lawyer; his ex-wife claimed half of the remaining payment; and
finally, though he regained his job, he lost seniority, which may have played a
role in his layoff one year later due to downsizing. Id. at 3–5.
105. The general requirement is to file a charge within 180 calendar days
from the date of discrimination, but the deadline is extended to 300 days “if a
state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination
on the same basis.” Time Limits for Filing a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm [https://perma
.cc/8SBJ-9FJ5].
106. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 10–12.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2018).
108. The exception to this is hostile work environment and pay discrimination claims. In the former, the idea is that a hostile work environment can build
over years and so it is appropriate to consider all of the acts that constitute a
full-grown hostile workplace. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
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B. PEOPLE DON’T “WIN” EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Employment discrimination plaintiffs are derailed by the
law at every stage of litigation. Procedurally, many plaintiffs are
forced to arbitrate their claims—a phenomenon that disadvantages employment discrimination plaintiffs. Additionally,
the barriers for class actions have risen to the point that only one
percent of filings are certified, chilling the prospects for those
with claims that only make sense in aggregated form.109 Among
cases filed in court, about one-third are disposed of by motion,
but virtually all of these successful motions are ones filed by the
employer.110 In the few cases that actually reach trial, plaintiffs
rarely win and the odds of that decision being reversed on appeal
are nearly a coin flip.111 Finally, most cases settle for small
amounts and silence victims through nondisclosure agreements.112 While this section on legal barriers will be compressed—in part due to the volume of prior coverage and in part
due to constraints of length113—it will provide a survey of these
impediments.
1. Mandatory Arbitration and Class Relief
Procedurally, there are several different ways that plaintiffs
are derailed from pursuing litigation. One such way is found in
the law surrounding class actions. Class actions have long been
understood as indispensable for antidiscrimination: class actions
generate publicity and can better deter future discrimination;114
101, 115 (2002). Regarding the latter, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
modified the law to say that the discriminatory act renews itself with each new
inequitable paycheck. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
109. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 264.
110. Id. at 60–65.
111. Supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. Another comprehensive
study found that plaintiffs win at trial between 20 and 40% of the time upon
reaching trial—depending upon whether the trial is in front of a judge (19.29%)
or jury (37.77%). Clermont & Schwab, supra note 100, at 457 app. (analyzing
employment discrimination outcomes over a period of time between 1979 and
2000).
112. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 19.
113. Entire books have been devoted to the limits and nuances of employment discrimination procedure and substantive doctrine, including two excellent ones published just last year. See, e.g., JOSEPH A SEINER, THE SUPREME
COURT’S NEW WORKPLACE: PROCEDURAL RULINGS AND SUBSTANTIVE WORKER
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2017); SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11. Exploring all of these nuances is beyond the scope of this Article.
114. SEINER, supra note 113, at 59.
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discriminatory people or policies often harm more than just one
employee in the organization;115 and the damages are often low
enough that aggregation is necessary to incentivize lawyers to
bring such suits.116 Indeed, the advisory notes on Rule 23(b)(2)
specifically mention civil rights lawsuits as ones where class action status may be particularly appropriate.117 Even so, it has
become substantially harder to bring (and win) class action
cases. Courts have increasingly applied more stringent interpretations of the commonality requirement,118 as well as required
more in the way of merits before certifying the class.119 These
changes culminated in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, where the Supreme Court declined to certify a class in an employment discrimination case in which the female plaintiffs alleged they were
paid unequally, disproportionately excluded from management,
and frequently encountered bias.120 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the discriminatory actions of local managers across
the country were not enough to establish a company-wide “pattern and practice” of discrimination.121 In light of the fact that
the Court would not allow this meticulously-litigated case out of
the starting gate, plaintiffs’ lawyers are far less apt to bring such
lawsuits in the future.122
Another procedural impediment is found in mandatory arbitration agreements (MAAs). Mandatory arbitration has long
been derided by scholars as a way in which employers tilt the
odds further in their favor.123 Nevertheless, MAAs are more popular than ever, with an estimated sixty million workers being
subject to such agreements.124 Companies like Google, Star115. Id. at 13.
116. Id. at 59 (noting class actions are critical for those with “smaller monetary claims, who might not otherwise have been able to obtain representation”
to access their statutory rights); id. at 158.
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amend.
118. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 37.
119. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 69.
120. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
121. Id. at 69.
122. SEINER, supra note 113, at 64.
123. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1649–50 (2005) (recognizing that MAAs allow employers to utilize a variety of methods to gain an advantage over employees).
124. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration: Access to the Courts Is Now Barred for More than 60 Million American Workers,
ECON. POLICY INST. (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MWT-8R6K].
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bucks, and Uber all require workers to sign MAAs.125 The problems with mandatory arbitration are varied, but can be distilled
into three essential concerns: (1) it unfairly favors employers,
(2) it is opaque and nonreviewable, and (3) it further erodes class
actions.
First, employers are systematically favored by arbitration.
While employees rarely “win” in litigation and recover only modest amounts when they do,126 employees win even less frequently
and in smaller amounts when arbitrating.127 This is in part because employers, as “repeat players,” can choose arbitrators that
have been known to rule in favor of other employers.128 Arbitrators likewise have a built-in incentive “to favor employers, who
unlike employees, are in a position to hire the arbitrator again
in the future.”129 Thus employers begin arbitration with a thumb
on the scale.
Second, arbitration is a private form of resolution that is unaccountable to the public. This opacity implicates substantive
justice, as even if an arbitrator’s decision is decided incorrectly
as a matter of law, it is nearly impossible to appeal the outcome
under federal law.130 Furthermore, arbitrators are more likely to
conserve rather than expand the law, a tendency that owes
125. Alexia Fernandez Campbell & Alvin Chang, There’s a Good Chance
You’ve Waived the Right To Sue Your Boss, VOX (Sep. 7, 2018), https://www.vox
.com/2018/8/1/16992362/sexual-harassment-mandatory-arbitration [https://
perma.cc/TB3G-WQP6].
126. Supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
127. Zev. J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, Deferring for Justice: How Administrative Agencies Can Solve the Employment Dispute Quagmire by Endorsing an
Improved Arbitration System, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 259 (2016);
David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Employment Arbitration After
the Revolution, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 478–79 (2016) (analyzing arbitration
win rates through statistics); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 185 (2019).
128. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2011)
(finding a strong “repeat-employer-arbitrator pairing effect” and concluding we
ought to be concerned about possible “arbitrator bias” or an employer’s ability
to select more pro-employer arbitrators).
129. Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV.
463, 507–08 (2018).
130. David Seligman, The National Consumer Law Center’s Model State
Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement Act: Protecting Consumers, Employees, and States from the Harms of Forced Arbitration Through State-Level
Reforms, 19 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 58, 59 (2016).
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partly to the need to appease employers who can rehire the arbitrator in the future.131 This inherent secrecy starkly disadvantages employees.
Third, the Supreme Court’s 2018 ruling in Epic Systems
Corp. v. Lewis, which allows companies to require workers to accept individual arbitration, further undermines the possibility
of class relief.132 The most recent evidence shows that nearly half
of employees covered by arbitration clauses have waived their
right to be part of a class action.133 As a result, employees must
proceed individually through the arbitration process, further increasing the likelihood that their claims will fail to spur systemic
change within the organization. All three of these concerns have
coalesced in the recent very public criticism of MAAs, which has
spanned from law students at elite schools protesting against
law firms134 to victims of sexual harassment protesting the unavailability of a judicial forum.135
2. Dispositive Motions
Another reason plaintiffs don’t “win” discrimination claims
lies in the increasing use of dispositive motions. Judges have
adopted a host of rules and doctrines that they use to dismiss
employment discrimination cases. Among federal employment
discrimination cases, approximately thirty-seven percent are resolved by dispositive motions.136 Among those cases that achieve
a fully litigated outcome, i.e., those that are not settled, eightysix percent are dismissed via motion.137 Further, the result in
dismissals is almost completely one-sided, with recent studies
131. Sternlight, supra note 127, at 186–93 (arguing that employment arbitrators are less likely to issue progressive decisions than courts).
132. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (stating arbitration agreements with class and collective waivers are enforceable under the
FAA).
133. Colvin, supra note 128, at 2.
134. See, e.g., Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Female Law Students Pressure
Firms To Stop Banning Sexual Harassment Suits, VOX (Dec. 3, 2018), https://
www.vox.com/2018/12/3/18123798/womens-student-association-mandatory
-arbitration [https://perma.cc/PE49-4RZE].
135. Nuñez, supra note 129, at 467.
136. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 60–65 (basing its conclusion on combining the dismissal rates for several procedures yielding involuntary disposal
without a trial).
137. Of the author’s quantitative dataset of 1672 cases, 833 were settled at
some stage in the litigation. Of the 710 remaining cases that reached a fully
litigated outcome, 610 (or 86%) of those were dismissed. Id. at 68.
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finding that three-quarters of summary judgment motions are
resolved in favor of the employer.138
For motions to dismiss, the Twombly and Iqbal cases—decided by the Supreme Court in 2007 and 2009, respectively—
have starkly increased dismissal rates in antidiscrimination
suits.139 Historically, courts employed a generous standard and
only dismissed complaints if it was “beyond doubt” the plaintiff
could prove “no set of facts” that would establish liability.140 But
Twombly and Iqbal, taken together, require plaintiffs’ pleadings
in all civil claims to be “facially plausible” in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.141 This new standard might generally seem
reasonable, but factual development is particularly difficult in
employment discrimination cases where the touchstone is often
intent—something that is nearly impossible to establish without
access, often through discovery, to the employer’s personnel and
policies.142 Heightened pleading standards thus result in a catch22: the plaintiff’s claim cannot survive to the discovery phase
without having sufficient facts, but the plaintiff cannot obtain
sufficient facts without discovery. The plausibility standard has
been a devastating phenomenon for employment discrimination

138. Sperino and Thomas cite two studies, one from 2007 and one from 2013,
which found that employers consistently win on summary judgment in discrimination cases. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 23. Specifically, one study
found employers winning such motions 83% of the time and the other around
70%. Id.
139. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal
Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 608–09 (2010). Studies of Twombly
and Iqbal (Twiqbal) have been legion, but also criticized for their indeterminacy.
See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013) (noting the proliferation of empirical
studies of limited determinative value following the Twombly and Iqbal decisions).
140. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
141. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678, 681 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 546–47 (2007).
142. SEINER, supra note 113, at 30. Consider hiring discrimination cases,
where applicants frequently fail to hear back from the employer or are rejected
with little accompanying information. It might be impossibly difficult for such
a plaintiff to allege “plausible” hiring discrimination. Id. Seiner contrasts this
inside information problem with tort claims, for example, where typical plaintiffs “would have the same access to photos, police investigation reports, and
insurance information.” Id. at 31.
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plaintiffs, increasing the rates at which motions to dismiss are
granted in Title VII cases from forty-two to fifty-three percent.143
For summary judgment motions, there are two trends—one
general and one specific—that undercut employment discrimination suits. The general tendency has been the increased granting of motions for summary judgment (MSJs) in resolving disputes. Courts were at one point cautious about such motions. But
then in a trio of cases referred to as the “Celotex trilogy,” the
Court flipped the conventional wisdom on MSJs. In particular,
the Celotex Court ruled that the party moving for summary judgment need not offer evidence to negate the other side’s claim, but
can instead simply point to the absence of evidence offered by
the other side.144 The Court also explicitly endorsed the use of
MSJs, noting their utility in securing “the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”145 The result has been an
uptick in cases resolved by summary judgment in almost every
subject matter area, but especially employment discrimination
cases.146
The specific trend undercutting employment discrimination
suits has been the proliferation of rules and doctrines—most
heavily criticized—that all work in favor of employers. In particular, these doctrines allow judges to minimize, or disregard altogether, possible evidence of employment bias. Three key rules
are: (1) the same-actor inference, under which courts resist allegations of discrimination if the alleged discriminator is the same
person who made the original hiring decision;147 (2) the stray remarks doctrine, under which words or statements that could be

143. Hatamyar, supra note 139, at 608–09; see SEINER, supra note 113, at
25 (calling Twombly and Iqbal “the two most devastating cases for employment
plaintiffs in the last decade”).
144. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
145. Id. at 327 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
146. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1048–53 (2003) (citing
studies that show courts granted summary judgment more often after the Celotex trilogy and noting the effect has been pronounced in the areas of “civil
rights” and “age discrimination,” among others).
147. Amirmokri v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995)
(determining the company’s failure to promote the plaintiff was not due to bias
on basis of national origin—even though the worker was harassed on account of
his Iranian descent almost daily—since the people who made the decision to
hire him were the ones who later made the decision not to promote him).
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used to show bias are excluded if they are unrelated to the employment decision, too remote in time, or too ambiguous;148 and
(3) the adverse action doctrine, under which actions such as giving a negative evaluation, assigning additional work, or even
threatening to fire a worker are not considered serious enough
to be actionable as discrimination.149 As a complement to these
bias-minimizing rules, courts typically exclude evidence of discrimination experienced by other employees, sometimes called
“me-too” evidence, on the theory that it is more prejudicial than
probative.150 The tenor of these doctrines is that antidiscrimination laws do not make it illegal to treat employees unfairly. But
such laws do proscribe treating an employee unfairly because of
a protected trait.151 Accordingly, Title VII expressly requires
that courts second-guess unfairness of a certain kind when it
manifests in personnel decisions.152 Nevertheless, courts frequently invoke the sentiment that they do not sit as a “superpersonnel department” to second-guess the employer’s decisions—even when the employer’s actions could be interpreted as
pretextual in nature.153
While any one of these bias-minimizing rules or inferences
might be justified within the confines of a particular case, taken
148. E.g., Sweezer v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. No. 99-1644, 2000 WL 1175644, at
*5 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (determining that even though plaintiff was called
“nigger” and “bitch,” supervisor’s “comments were brief and isolated, and are
more indicative of a personality conflict than of racial animus”).
149. E.g., Myers v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, No. CCB-09-3391, 2010 WL
3120070, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2010) (finding that even though termination was
threatened, there was no “tangible detrimental effect to the terms or conditions
of his employment”); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Retaliation and the Reasonable
Person, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2031, 2036 (2015) (showing that courts construe the
adverse action requirement narrowly and routinely dismiss cases in which
workers allege, e.g., that employers subjected them to negative evaluations, disciplinary write-ups, shift changes, and removal from an office).
150. GREEN, supra note 13, at 105; see, e.g., Jones v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc.,
823 F. Supp. 2d 699, 734 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“‘Me too’ evidence is typically inadmissible under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because it prejudices
the defendant by embellishing the plaintiff ’s own evidence of alleged discrimination and typically confusing the issue of whether the plaintiff, and not others,
was discriminated against.”).
151. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 78.
152. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-5(g) (2018).
153. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 78–83 (surveying the various
ways in which the phrase “super-personnel department” is used to believe the
employer’s stated reason, even when the evidence suggests the reason is untrue,
the employer did not follow its posted qualifications, or the employer did not
follow its own policies).
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together they often make it prohibitively difficult for plaintiffs to
prevail. Specifically, judges use these doctrines to “slice and dice”
specific pieces of evidence from the case.154 This evidentiary sidelining of biased statements or pretext-implying decisions can
transform a plaintiff’s colorable case into a legal nonstarter. Entire articles and book chapters have been devoted to these biasminimizing doctrines,155 so I merely flag them here. The critical
point is that, cumulatively, these doctrines as well as others like
them have amalgamated into a major barrier for employment
discrimination plaintiffs seeking justice in the courts.
3. Settlements, Trials, and Appeals
The final reason employment discrimination plaintiffs do
not “win” their claims is discovered through analyzing what actually constitutes a “win.” Leading up to trial, the majority of
cases are settled and the best evidence to date indicates the median settlement is around $30,000.156 Even if one is lucky enough
to settle for more—the seventy-fifth percentile settlement is
closer to six figures157—the result may still be unfulfilling. The
attorney will take a cut, the company will likely not make any
major structural changes, and the claimant will almost surely be
forced to sign a confidentiality agreement promising not to say
anything that would besmirch the company’s reputation.158 In
short, the material benefits of litigating or negotiating a discrimination claim are routinely trifling.
If the claim is not settled and actually proceeds to trial, employment discrimination plaintiffs face yet another obstacle:
proving the causal relationship between a protected trait and an
adverse employment decision. Proving causation is difficult in
any context,159 but discrimination cases present unique challenges. Cause as a concept is derived largely from the law of
torts, which is frequently geared toward understanding the

154. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577 (2001) (illustrating this phenomenon
through examination of cases).
155. Supra note 55.
156. BERREY ET AL., supra note 42, at 63.
157. Id. (noting a 75th percentile settlement value of $92,458).
158. Id. at 1–10 (providing several illustrative anecdotes).
159. For example, on the one end of causation is the butterfly effect and on
the other side is sole causation, but either could be reasonably understood as
causal in nature. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 102.
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physical causes of physical events.160 Nevertheless, “but for” causation is frequently invoked within the corpus of antidiscrimination law: it is the legal causation standard for retaliation and age
discrimination claims, and it is frequently invoked in disparate
treatment cases.161 Causation presents challenges for antidiscrimination law since the event of discrimination is often imperceptible. It is one thing to unpack cause and effect for a dented
bumper or broken leg. It is quite another to recognize the cause
for why one person out of eight applicants was not hired or promoted. Employment discrimination cases are thus challenging
to prove in large part because they revolve around nonphysical
and nonconcrete states of mind.162
As noted earlier, the odds of reaching trial and succeeding
are low,163 and the chances of succeeding at trial are further
stunted by the built-in limits of damage caps. The 1991 Civil
Rights Act capped compensatory and punitive damages for all
employers; the liability for the largest employers (500+ employees) is capped at $300,000 while the smallest covered employers
(15–100 employees) are capped at $50,000.164 These limited financial judgments curtail the ability of laws like Title VII or the
Americans with Disabilities Act to deter discrimination. When
160. Id. at 107. There are of course torts that do not fit this mold, such as the
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
161. In disparate treatment cases, a plaintiff can prevail by showing either
that the protected trait was the “but for” (or sole) cause of the adverse employment action (a “single motive” claim, which allows one to recover economic damages) or that the trait merely “motivated” the action (a mixed motive claim,
which does not allow one to recover economic damages). See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2018)) (indicating a plaintiff may prevail by showing a
trait was a “motivating factor” for any employment decision, but also creating
an affirmative defense where the employer can show it would have made the
same decision “in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor”).
162. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 107.
163. See supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (applying caps only to damages for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss
of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses and the amount of punitive
damages”). The caps do not apply to back pay or front pay. Pollard v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848–49 (2001). These caps have not been
adjusted since the Civil Rights Act was passed, and the caps are fixed—no matter how egregious the conduct. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 11, at 13. Finally, the caps do not apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), under which compensatory and punitive damages are not available,
but liquidated damages are (in effect, a doubling of back pay and front pay).
SEINER, supra note 113, at 11–13.
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employers do not have to worry about multimillion-dollar verdicts, discrimination may become part of the normal cost of doing
business.165
When cases are mishandled at trial, there is of course the
promise of righting the result through appeal. But an appeal presents no guarantee—just another bite at the apple. In fact, the
appellate process disproportionately favors employers. One
study found that when employers appeal a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, the appellate court reverses those wins forty-two percent of the time.166 In contrast, when the worker appeals a jury’s
defense verdict, the appellate court reverses the employer’s win
only seven percent of the time.167 Further, appealing a case is
expensive and, as with trials, it will likely take years to complete
the appeal. Those facts both cut in favor of employers, who usually have deeper pockets and a greater tolerance for delay.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AS
ANTIDISCRIMINATION
The concept of justice has consumed theorists for millennia.
Aristotle argued that justice requires rewards and punishments
be distributed according to “merit.”168 John Rawls averred that
justice is “the first virtue of social institutions.”169 Legal theorists also write incessantly about various formulations of justice.
Sometimes the focus is on the treatment of people within a legal
system, e.g., “juvenile justice” or “access to justice.”170 Other
times the focus is on the rationale for how a law is structured,
e.g., “corrective justice” or “distributive justice.”171 Accordingly,

165. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class
Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV.
1249, 1301, 1322–23 (2003) (arguing the damage caps place such a low price on
discrimination that businesses might naturally treat it as a “controllable cost of
doing business”).
166. Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 552 (2003).
167. Id.
168. THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. V, ch. III (R.W. Browne
trans., H.G. Bohn 1853) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
169. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971).
170. E.g., Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1785 (2001).
171. E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality
of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 988–95 (1988) (discussing these iterations of justice).
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discussing justice in a coherent way often requires focus on a
specific domain, such as the court system or workplace.
Despite all of its philosophical trappings, justice is quite a
pragmatic lens through which to view the workplace. Nearly everyone has at some point felt that a work situation was unfair;
indeed, the workplace naturally foments feelings of injustice in
several ways. First, the fact that employers typically distribute
finite goods and compensation based upon some notion of merit
means that some workers will necessarily enjoy more goods than
others; inequality is built in. Second, any distribution of outcomes in the workplace typically happens according to some set
of rules and standards and employees are likely to form judgments about the fairness of these criteria. Third, most workplaces are socially dynamic organizations, requiring people to interact. The quality of these interactions can stir up thoughts that
a particular person has acted in ways that are biased or unjust.
Organizational Justice, as a field of study, is thus a natural extension of the way in which the workplace produces feelings oriented around whether compensation, policies, and people are
just.
As noted in the Introduction, Organizational Justice is generally thought to sub-divide into three sets of work-related concerns: (1) what people receive (distributive justice); (2) the
standards, rules, and processes under which people receive (procedural justice); and (3) how people are treated along the way
(interactional justice).172 While all three subdivisions are valuable, this Article focuses on general perceptions of justice. There
has been a recent shift toward focusing on “overall justice climate perceptions”—a generalized measure of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice.173 There is compelling evidence that overall justice perceptions are what drive behavior
within organizations, more so than any one specific sub-dimensions.174
Of course, there is no way to document the precise level of
justice in any particular organization. One might productively
think about Organizational Justice through the metaphor of oil
172. Id. Interactional justice is often further divided into interpersonal justice, which concerns the treatment of employees by supervisors or managers,
and informational justice—a concern characterized by the “quality of information employees obtain from communications with their supervisor or managers.” Cho & Sai, supra note 22.
173. Rubino et al., supra note 52, at 523.
174. Id.
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for the workplace’s smooth operation. When the emotional heat
is low, the gears of the workplace are well-lubricated and employees can work comfortably and productively toward a shared
mission.175 But when people’s feelings turn up the emotional
heat in the workplace, individuals can readily ignite and engage
in workplace aggression, such as invidious discrimination or harassment.176 Importantly, workers’ perceptions of justice may
“fully mediate the effects of changes in the workplace on aggression.”177 In other words, when people view the workplace as principally fair, they are far less likely to lash out when policies
change or they otherwise face negative outcomes at work.
Many observers have, quite naturally, deduced that the connection between justice and discrimination is that discrimination is unjust. Indeed, some scholars have made this connection
explicit: that fairness or justice is the touchstone of antidiscrimination law.178 This Part will explore the relationship from the
other vantage point, which is perhaps less straightforward: how
the relative amount of justice in an organization might either
prevent or contribute to discrimination. Specifically, my claim is
that Organizational Justice has a previously-unexplored role to
play, both in fending off harassment and discrimination, and in
fostering the willingness of workers to internally report such behaviors.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE CAN PREVENT DISCRIMINATION
Legal scholarship typically does not examine why people discriminate or harass others.179 Even most social science scholarship overlooks why people choose to discriminate, by focusing on
victims in lieu of perpetrators.180 Yet when people differentiate
175. Cho & Sai, supra note 22, at 245 (discussing Organizational Justice as
a “lubricant” for smoothing out employee development programs in the workplace).
176. I.M. Jawahar, A Model of Organizational Justice and Workplace Aggression, 28 J. MGMT. 811, 814 (2002).
177. Id. at 814.
178. Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy To Prevent Discrimination, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2116 (2015).
179. That said, scholars have gradually and increasingly built a persuasive
case for considering the general relationship between emotions and the law.
See, for example, Susan Bandes’s early, seminal book tying emotions to law.
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (chronicling the place of
emotions in the law through a series of essays on different legal subjects).
180. E.g., Krings & Facchin, supra note 27, at 501 (“Most research [on sexual
harassment] has focused on prevalence, on targets’ reactions and perceptions,
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between persons, they surely do so for a reason—a fact that antidiscrimination doctrine expressly acknowledges.181 Two conventional explanations for why people discriminate is stereotyping and in-group preference,182 but there is a third, more
recently-discovered reason: acute injustice.
Employees are more likely to experience feelings such as injustice, anger, or envy when they perceive that a policy or course
of action is fundamentally unjust.183 These feelings serve as “action tendencies,” prompting certain employees to act unethically
or to discriminate against others.184 Moreover, even when perceived injustices do not result in workers enacting full-blown discrimination, there are a variety of less severe ways that perceived injustices may cause employees to interfere with the
opportunities of others. Such actions may include gossip, favoritism, or sabotaging others’ work efforts.185 Discrimination may
thus be understood, in some instances, as an act of aggression in
response to perceived injustices.186

and on prevention. Little is known about why and when actors engage in harassing behavior.”). Of course, the paucity of research on people who discriminate
is in part due to the research difficulties in obtaining adequate samples of actual
discriminators. Id.
181. Courts presume that people do not act in an arbitrary manner. So, if
discrimination is alleged, and the employer cannot provide a legitimate reason
for the adverse employment action, courts will generally assume the employer
based its decision on an impermissible consideration. See, e.g., Furnco Const.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“[W]e know from our experience that
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for
the employer’s actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally
assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.”).
182. Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the
Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV.
589, 593 (2006).
183. Russell Cropanzano et al., Entity Justice and Entity Injustice: A Review
and Conceptual Extension, in JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 30, at
224 (citing studies); Davidai & Gilovich, supra note 28, at 837 (noting felt injustices can produce envy); Christine A. Henle & Megan Naude, An Eye for an Eye:
Counterproductive Work Behavior as an Emotional Reaction to Injustice in the
Workplace, in ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 140, 145 (citing studies).
184. Supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
185. See generally SABOTAGE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 27.
186. Wood et al., supra note 51, at 618.
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In fact, when an employee perceives multiple forms of injustice, or if the inequity is felt to be particularly severe, the response may sometimes culminate in one person choosing to verbally or physically harass another person.187 Imagine that an
employee feels he was unjustly denied a critical promotion. Social science research shows that an employee who perceives such
an injustice may then attempt to punish the decision-maker or
the person who actually received the promotion via sexual or racial harassment.188 Or, this employee might choose to harass
other people by directing his frustration or aggression toward
someone else in the organization who is less able to impose jobrelated costs upon him.189 Researchers refer to this phenomenon
as “displacement,” because the injustice-induced aggression is
displaced onto a convenient, and often safer, target.190
This Article is not suggesting that most people discriminate
or harass others because they face unfairness in the workplace.
Even so, compelling new evidence indicates that an organizationally just climate can serve as a strong deterrent to—and predictor of—discrimination and harassment.191 Specifically, an organizational focus on fairness through polices and rewards can
cause all employees to feel respected, establish expectations for
how employees should treat coworkers, and foster the value of

187. Jawahar, supra note 176, at 819.
188. Krings & Facchin, supra note 27, at 507 (demonstrating perceptions of
organizational injustice increased sexual harassment); see O’Leary-Kelly et al.,
supra note 27, at 375–77, 384 (observing perceived injustices may lead one to
sexually harass as a means of pursuing retributive justice); see also SABOTAGE
IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE, supra note 27, at 24–35 (chronicling the way in
which emotions such as envy can lead one to harass others); Niels van de Ven
et al., supra note 26, at 426 (discussing how unchecked envy, when it arises in
an unjust environment, can drive discrimination or harassment against others);
Vecchio, supra note 26, at 205 (same).
189. O’Leary-Kelly et al., supra note 27, at 376.
190. Id. (observing the employee who feels unfairly treated might displace
their harassment onto “those who are perceived as similar to the individual who
caused the goal frustration but are less powerful socially”); see also MELINDA
JONES, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 132 (2002) (“History is replete with
examples of political figures in times of economic contraction affixing economic
blame onto minority groups.”).
191. E.g., id. at 524, 539–40 (finding support for “collective justice climate as
an independent predictor of harassment and a moderator of the effectives of
objectively measured sex similarity and harassment climate on sexual harassment”).
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evenhanded treatment among workers.192 Fair managerial practices cause workers to feel “valued, respected, and integrated
within the work domain.”193 When workplaces and their constituent policies are just, employees are less likely to lash out toward coworkers or the organization.194 Thus, hewing to the normative values of Organizational Justice, discussed further
below,195 has the potential to increase equality of opportunity by
depressing the negative emotions and the negative actions that
most affect marginalized groups and individuals.196
Even when injustice is not perpetrated by another person,
such as when employees feel that a policy or rule is unfair, the
felt inequity can still increase discrimination. For example, imagine that the employee who was denied the promotion feels that
an organization’s promotion criteria are biased and fundamentally unfair. The employee might seek retribution against other
people—more concrete scapegoats—rather than the organization.197 This approach is part of a subordinating, historical pattern in which individuals may direct aggression for distressing
events toward vulnerable third parties who bear no responsibility.198
Organizational Justice can also decrease discrimination by
advancing nondiscrimination as a guiding workplace value.
Where decisions are not consistently based upon accurate, jobrelated information, it becomes more likely that decisions will
turn instead on group-based heuristics—something legal scholars have termed “statistical discrimination.”199 That is, when
192. Id. at 520, 524.
193. Rubino et al., supra note 52, at 526.
194. Supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
195. Infra Part III.A (discussing the normative values of just workplaces).
196. See Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 137 (observing one form of counterproductive work behavior is political deviance, in which one seeks to “disadvantage others personally or politically (e.g., favoritism, gossiping or blaming
coworkers, unproductive competition)”).
197. Krings & Facchin, supra note 27, at 502. If the perceived unfairness is
severe enough, he might discriminate or degrade others in an attempt to achieve
the instrumental and expressive aims outlined above.
198. In one particularly stark example, researchers found that as the economy declined between 1882 and 1930 the numbers of black lynchings increased.
JONES, supra note 190, at 132.
199. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 842–43 (1991) (observing that
“statistical discrimination” derives from people making “rational statistical inferences about average differences among [ ] groups”); Cass R. Sunstein, The
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employers lack clear information, they often use group stereotypes to sort out characteristics that are seen as costly or otherwise undesirable, e.g., criminal convictions or bankruptcies.200
For example, in one study, economists concluded that employers frequently discriminate against African American males
by using race as a proxy for involvement in the criminal justice
system.201 The authors of that study then made a startling finding: employers who actually used criminal background checks
were over fifty percent more likely to hire African Americans
than employers who did not.202 That study illustrates that employers who are not making decisions according to set criteria or
information are more likely to rely on group-based heuristics
that may harm disadvantaged populations. Having data or other
metrics in place for employment decision-making—a form of procedural justice—can help steer decision-makers away from discriminatory biases or favoritism.203 For instance, the ability to
draw on factual information about criminal backgrounds prevented many employers from instead drawing discriminatory inferences based on race and acting upon them.204 Lior Strahilevitz
has argued that having access to more relevant information, and
actually making use of it pursuant to set criteria, can keep employers from overemphasizing “readily discernible facts like race
or gender.”205 In this way, Organizational Justice provides a

Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2417 (1994) (arguing “statistical discrimination” occurs when generalizations about a group are seen as “less costly
to use than any subclassifying device”).
200. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 363, 365 (2008).
201. Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background
Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453
(2006) (concluding that in the absence of background checks, employers use race
“and other perceived correlates of criminal activity to assess the likelihood of an
applicant’s previous felony convictions and factor such assessments into the hiring decision”).
202. Strahilevitz, supra note 200, at 367 (citing Holzer et al., supra note 201,
at 464).
203. Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 137 (noting that organizational injustice may lead to personal aggression, sexual harassment, and favoritism);
Paul E. Levy et al., The Role of Due Process in Performance Appraisal: A
20-Year Retrospective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE,
supra note 19, at 605, 605–06.
204. Holzer et al., supra note 201, at 464.
205. Strahilevitz, supra note 200, at 372 (arguing for the government to subsidize “information clearinghouses” for employers that store people’s past em-
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structural framework within which all individuals—and especially those from less-privileged backgrounds—can avoid instances of discrimination and, in turn, pursue their full potential.206
B. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE CAN MODERATE THE EFFECTS OF
DISCRIMINATION
There is a second way—other than preventing discrimination—that Organizational Justice may advance nondiscrimination goals: by moderating the effects of discrimination. Social
psychologists have documented that the effect of negative treatment is uneven, with more privileged groups being less affected.207 For example, when women perceive discrimination,
their psychological well-being is likely to be harmed; in contrast,
men report that perceived discrimination has little to no effect
on their internal wellness.208 This observation seems to illuminate the resiliency of privilege—a phenomenon that Nancy DiTomas poignantly describes as “an invisible knapsack” that majority group members carry around.209 This knapsack is, in her
words, “filled with institutional social resources to use whenever
necessary,” and it also provides “a cognitive experience of goodwill and affective preference that allows [majority group members] to feel confident, secure, and capable as they make decisions and encounter choices throughout their lives.”210 This
metaphor helps explain why many workers who are deprived of
fairness in the workplace, and especially those who belong to underprivileged groups, can “lose their sense of belonging and existence in a given context and tend to become lonely, depressed

ployee evaluations, involvement in bankruptcy or criminal justice systems, military records, and educational credentials). Strahilevitz concludes that statistical discrimination is “often more troubling than overt discrimination on the basis of criminal or bankruptcy history.” Id. at 380.
206. Id.
207. Michael M. Harris et al., “I Think They Discriminated Against Me”: Using Prototype Theory and Organizational Justice Theory for Understanding Perceived Discrimination in Selection and Promotion Situations, 12 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 54, 62 (2004).
208. Id.
209. NANCY DITOMASO, THE AMERICAN NON-DILEMMA: RACIAL INEQUALITY
WITHOUT RACISM 7 (2013).
210. Id. (citations omitted).
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and anxious and, over time, withdraw.”211 In short, discrimination has its most profound effects on the least privileged constituencies, reproducing hierarchies and the privilege of the status
quo.
But, research shows that Organizational Justice can moderate the effects of bias in the workplace. When employees see
their workplaces as fair, they are less likely to emotionally suffer
from discriminatory decisions—at least those decisions that stop
short of termination.212 In other words, these employees may
still face bias in the workplace, but they may be better emotionally equipped to weather the effects. Specifically, studies show
that when employees have strong perceptions of Organizational
Justice, those workers are less likely to feel anxiety, depression,
and emotional exhaustion due to discrimination.213 This effect is
amplified when the source of discrimination is not a manager but
is instead a coworker or a customer.214 Put another way, employees may see discrimination by a coworker or customer as less
troubling within a just organization—which can in turn mitigate
the emotive effects of bias, such as depression. When managers
enact Organizational Justice principles, therefore, it can mitigate the effects of discrimination even when the discrimination
cannot be prevented altogether.
Of course, one might question whether moderating the effects of discrimination is a good thing. Some might think it best
for victims to fully feel the exclusionary effects of discrimination,
which in turn could make them more likely to litigate such
claims. This argument has merit, but is misplaced for a few key
reasons. First, and most importantly, it is not mutually exclusive
for an organization’s culture to moderate the effects of depression and emotional exhaustion and simultaneously be a place
211. Yuka Fujimoto et al., Toward a Diversity Justice Management Model:
Integrating Organizational Justice and Diversity Management, 9 SOC. RESP. J.
148, 150 (2013).
212. In the case of termination, it stands to reason both that the employee is
likely to think the organization has inflicted a distributional injustice upon her
and that this perception of injustice is unlikely to be mitigated much by past
thoughts or feelings that her former workplace was a fair one.
213. Wood et al., supra note 51, at 628 (“[O]rganizational justice perceptions
are important ingredients in any explanation of the effect of discrimination on
employees’ well-being . . . .”).
214. See id. at 628 (“[M]anagers’ role as custodians and inventors of organizational policies may be crucial in explaining why their acts of discrimination
are perceived as reflecting badly on the organization procedures and allocation
of rewards . . . .”).
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where workers feel free to raise claims of discrimination or harassment. As the Section below shows, Organizational Justice actually increases the likelihood that workers will report behavior
that they perceive to be discriminatory. Second, even if Organizational Justice theoretically made it less likely for employees to
litigate their grievances, that opportunity cost currently does not
seem very high. As previously described, the typical experience
of employment discrimination litigants is not very empowering:
the chances of actually reaching trial are low, the median settlement is inadequate, and the litigation process exacts a great personal cost.215 I am not claiming that the calculus of whether to
sue is generally clear one way or another, only that it is contestable whether more litigation will increase the well-being for minority groups.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE CAN INCREASE REPORTING OF
DISCRIMINATION
When harassment occurs within an organization, it must be
reported or an employee’s claim may later be doomed in the legal
process.216 In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court decided two
cases that, in certain instances,217 give employers an affirmative
defense against sexual harassment claims when there is an investigative protocol in place to address sexual harassment and
the employee does not take full advantage of it.218 The market
response to these decisions included the proliferation of antiharassment policies, grievance procedures, and sexual harassment training.219 While on the surface this spread of antidiscrimination policies looks like progress, the evidence indicates that
most such policies have not worked to deter sexual harassment.220 Further, research indicates that most women who are
215. Supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text.
216. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
217. Faragher/Ellerth is the affirmative defense for supervisor harassment
only; in cases alleging coworker harassment, there is a similar, but slightly different standard lower courts have devised, which is part of the employee’s affirmative burden to prove.
218. In Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, and Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, the Supreme
Court established a two-part affirmative defense by which employers may insulate themselves from liability for harassment that does not result in a tangible
employment action. See supra note 90.
219. DOBBIN, supra note 33, at 5–8.
220. Rubino et al., supra note 52, at 520. Perhaps most damning of all, when
the EEOC reviewed the empirical literature on harassment training in 2016, it
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harassed will not label the behavior as “sexual harassment,”
which will often prevent them from taking any action at all.221
Of those who do label the behavior as harassment, most still will
not report the treatment to an authority.222 In fact, somewhere
around seventy percent of those who experience harassment do
not talk to anyone in charge at work and a greater number still
refuse to file a formal complaint.223 Non-reporting persists even
though nearly every medium-to-large company has installed antiharassment protocols over the last several decades.224
One of the great challenges in addressing discrimination
and harassment is getting people to speak up—an enduring obstacle that the #MeToo era has illuminated.225 When an employee fails to report harassment, the organization does not receive notice about a person’s bad behavior, which increases the
refused to say whether such training was effective in preventing harassment.
Elizabeth C. Tippett, Adapting to the New Risk Landscape, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Feb. 1, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/adapting-to-the-new-risk-landscape
[https://perma.cc/AW4N-9UK8]; see also Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra
note 14, at 60 (2016) (observing “strategies for controlling bias . . . have failed
spectacularly since they were introduced . . . . The problem is that we can’t motivate people by forcing them to get with the program and punishing them if
they don’t”).
221. Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment,
84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 390 (1999).
222. See generally Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in Silence: Procedural
Justice Versus Gender Socialization Issues in University Sexual Harassment
Grievance Procedures, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 519, 520 (1995) (observing “most studies reveal that the majority of [sexual harassment] offenses
remain unreported”).
223. See Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Decade of Research in Review, in 1 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 485 tbl.2 (J. Barling & C.L. Cooper eds., 2008)
(citing two studies that show only 26% and 17–36%, respectively spoke to someone in authority about the harassment, and citing four studies that show somewhere between 2–20% of people who suffer harassment file a formal complaint).
One may naturally wonder if change lies around the corner now that
there is seemingly greater support for victims of sexual harassment. See supra
note 57. But even with greater social empathy, there are still tremendous costs
to reporting harassment—especially when the alleged perpetrator is a person
in a position of power. Further, all of the reasons why people do not file discrimination claims—fear of being disbelieved, fear of retaliation, and fear of poor
outcomes—apply in the sexual harassment context as well.
224. DOBBIN, supra note 33, at 1–11.
225. See, e.g., Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and Psychological
Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two
Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 406–07 (1997) (showing women
who are sexually harassed typically do not report harassment).
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likelihood that it will continue. In considering how to galvanize
reports of harassment, there has recently been a cultural rallying cry around the phrase “believe women.”226 But what does it
mean to believe women, and how exactly can that be accomplished? In the organizational context, we could understand “believe women” to mean fostering an expectation among employees
that their voice will be heard and also fairly and fully considered.227 But to support women’s claims in a way that is responsible to all parties requires fairness in process, or what Organizational Justice theorists describe as procedural justice.
Research shows that Organizational Justice is a strong predictor for whether employees will make the decision to report
harassment.228 Specifically, when employees believe that an organization is even-handed, they are more likely to utilize a grievance procedure—in part because they believe they will be
“heard” and in part because fairness perceptions can be an antidote to the fear of retaliation.229 In fact, social science demonstrates empirically that procedural justice concerns are more influential when it comes to whether victims file harassment
complaints than even gender socialization issues230—a traditional explanation for why so few women report sexual harassment.231
226. See generally Believe Women, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Believe_women [https://perma.cc/NUN8-QPSM].
227. See Sady Doyle, Despite What You May Have Heard, “Believe Women”
Has Never Meant “Ignore Facts,” ELLE, (Nov. 29, 2017) https://www.elle.com/
culture/career-politics/a13977980/me-too-movement-false-accusations-believe
-women/ [https://perma.cc/7PG5-94HD] (observing that “believe women” means
“don’t assume women as a gender are especially deceptive or vindictive, and
recognize that false allegations are less common than real ones”).
228. See Butler & Chung-Yan, supra note 31, at 750–51 (“The current study
also indicated that justice perceptions are especially important for predicting
reporting and confrontation responses when women have experienced frequent
sexual harassment.”); Rudman et al., supra note 222, at 534 (analyzing results
of research to conclude that procedural justice concerns are a “superior explicator of the reliably low reporting rate for sexual harassment”). But see Yoon Jik
Cho, Organizational Justice and Complaints in the US Federal Workplace, 22
INT’L REV. PUB. ADMIN. 172, 186–87 (2017) (concluding that “federal employees
are less likely to file complaints when they perceive” that the workplace is organizationally just).
229. Butler & Chung-Yan, supra note 31, at 750–51; Rudman et al., supra
note 222, at 537–38.
230. Rudman et al., supra note 222, at 537.
231. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies
and Procedures, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 497 (1991) (observing that women may, due
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It might seem counter-intuitive that perceptions of Organizational Justice can inspire reporting of discrimination and harassment. As Lauren Edelman has documented, certain types of
workplace policies that are oriented around nondiscrimination—
such as diversity training, affirmative action, and EEO offices—
can symbolize an employer’s good faith and chill litigation.232
Further, if an organization is actually fair and attentive to the
needs of its employees, it might mollify workers who would otherwise raise claims.233 But two responses to these points are in
order. First, research indicates that a truly just organizational
climate, not merely one with certain policies in place, is what
facilitates reporting.234 An employer cannot merely install certain policies and achieve Organizational Justice or nondiscrimination. In the next Section, I will explore the values that cause
people to feel their organization is just. Second, the research on
Organizational Justice is more specific than the general claim
that EEO policies often amount to structurally symbolic civil
rights;235 this research indicates that an organizationally just
climate facilitates internal reporting of sexual harassment—a
much more particular claim.236 Edelman is instead concerned
with the general possibility of employee cooption through policies that merely symbolize, but do not effectuate, a commitment
to antidiscrimination.237 In the final Section of Part III, I will
directly address Edelman’s claim as it might relate to all of my
arguments; for now, it suffices to say that Organizational Justice
can support employees, and especially women, as they move
through the internal processes for reporting sexual harassment.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN ACTION
This Article has thus far been concerned with building the
case for how Organizational Justice may further antidiscrimination values. In this Part, I outline the underlying normative values of Organizational Justice, which allow us to discern what
types of employment policies will produce more just workplaces.

to how they are socialized, emphasize caring (over justice) and nonconfrontation
in their responses to sexual harassment).
232. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
233. Cho, supra note 228, at 186–87.
234. Supra notes 228–31.
235. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 216.
236. Supra notes 228–31.
237. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 11 (discussing this concern).
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I also consider in greater detail what employers can do to advance fairness in the workplace. Finally, this Part considers several specific counterarguments that might be raised against my
thesis.
A. THE NORMATIVE VALUES OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
It is tempting to try to spell out the specific policies that, if
implemented, will increase justice in the workplace—a checklist
of sorts.238 But to do so would risk a version of “Goodhart’s Law,”
in which once “a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good
measure.”239 As antidiscrimination law has already shown, once
the installation of certain polices becomes the target, rather than
the underlying value of antidiscrimination, many employers
start to “game the system” or behave in ways that make the implementation of those EEO policies less effective.240 The most
helpful thing is not to gin up a “list of ready to go, discrete
measures that can be implemented across all organizations,”241
but rather to identify the hallmark values of Organizational Justice that transcend specific programs and provide a meta-guide
for future legal policies.

238. The counsel of Organizational Justice may naturally invite certain
managerial interventions, such as structuring the hiring process to be fairer
and more transparent for applicants, giving employees a voice when it comes to
changing workplace policies, and employing socially sensitive managers. See
Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 155 (advocating structural processes for employees to voice their “justice concerns”); Debra L. Shapiro & Elad N. Sherf, The
Role of Conflict in Managing Injustice, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN
THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 443, 453–54 (citing studies that prove the
role of “interpersonal sensitivity” in impacting justice perceptions); Donald M.
Truxillo et al., Applicant Fairness Reactions to the Selection Process, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 621, 629–32
(chronicling insights related to the types of selection tools that will maximize
perceptions by applicants of fairness and validity).
239. Goodhart’s Law, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goodhart%
27s_law [https://perma.cc/J8VV-7885].
240. Lauren Edelman has written about the role of organizations in affecting
nondiscrimination norms. She writes that organizations have instituted a variety of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) structures—such as diversity
training, affirmative action, and EEO offices—largely to “comply” with antidiscrimination laws. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 3–18. She laments that many
such policies are “merely symbolic,” or ineffective. Id. at 11. Worse, they may
actually “mask” discrimination both internally (as workers view employers as
nondiscriminatory) and externally (as lawyers and judges view employers as
nondiscriminatory). Id. at 5, 155–56, 171.
241. GREEN, supra note 13, at 136.
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1. Transparency
Scholars have long celebrated transparency and enlisted it
as a guiding principle for legal and policy reform.242 One might
see transparency’s intuitive allure as owing in part to its bond
with U.S. democracy, specifically, that governmental transparency fosters an accessible government and informed citizens who
can make better decisions to hold the regime accountable.243 In
the context of the workplace, transparency is one of the most
critical determinants of whether a system is seen as fair.244
Transparency naturally implicates both material employment
outcomes (distributive justice) and the way in which decisions at
work are made (procedural justice).
For transparency to be accomplished in the workplace, it is
critical that employees have both notice and knowledge of the
applicable rules or standards.245 This insight borrows from “fairness heuristic theory,” under which people have a tendency to
make fairness judgments from the information that is readily
available to them.246 Within this vein, workers who feel that they
understand a performance appraisal process are much more
likely to rate the system as fair.247 Of course, for transparency to
truly facilitate justice, employees’ understandings of how the
rules and standards will be applied must also match up with how
they are actually applied.
Transparency can foster both justice itself and perceptions
of justice. One of the best examples is found in hiring. When employers resolve to hire someone, they must make decisions
around both advertising the job and providing criteria for the position. For current employees, the decision to advertise the job
widely and to be detailed about specific job requirements is a
show of transparency, which belies nepotism and encourages
242. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 958–63 (2006) (arguing for more transparency
in criminal procedure); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 533 (1999) (“It has long been a value in
liberal constitutional regimes that regulation be transparent.”); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1999) (making the case for “corporate
social transparency”).
243. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 894
(2006).
244. Levy et al., supra note 203, at 609–10.
245. Id.
246. Fujimoto et al., supra note 211, at 157.
247. Levy et al., supra note 203, at 610.
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perceptions of fairness. Moreover, transparency in job openings
and eligibility encourages nondiscrimination by “operat[ing] as
a shortcut around biased information networks.”248 In contrast,
when job criteria are less explicit, decision-makers are more
likely to “shift job criteria to fit the qualifications of the candidate who best fits gendered (or racial) expectations for a job.”249
Or consider again the study involving criminal background
checks.250 Actually having information about applicants’ criminal backgrounds resulted in less discrimination against African
Americans given that the factual information was more favorable than the inferences employers otherwise drew.251 In other
words, transparency in the specific area of criminal history decreased discrimination by cutting out the application of racial
stereotypes.
One notable adjunct to transparency is voice: when employees are given a chance for their voices to be heard regarding
workplace policies, they are less likely to view the employer’s
systems as opaque and more likely to see them as fair.252 Increasing voice increases interactional justice, which is one of the most
difficult sub-dimensions of Organizational Justice to ensure.253
One simple and costless system for facilitating voice is to have a
complaint or suggestion process. Even if a particular complaint
does not lead to any change, simply allowing the complaint to be
made increases the perception that the workplace’s policies are
fair.254 In a similar vein, allowing employees to give input into

248. GREEN, supra note 13, at 137.
249. Id. at 114. Of course, this still happens with explicit criteria, where people may emphasize or deemphasize certain criteria to favor certain groups. See
Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63
STAN. L. REV. 351, 404 (2011) (showing that greater workplace transparency
can lead to greater compliance with employment discrimination laws).
250. Supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text.
251. Id.
252. See Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 155 (advocating structural processes for employees to voice their “justice concerns”).
253. Specifically, it is hard to ensure through policy that managers treat people with dignity and easier to simply implement certain policies or adjust compensation. Social psychologists have observed that when employees are allowed
to provide input or feedback, it is one of the most effective ways to increase interactional justice. Juan Diego Vaamonde & Alicia Omar, Perceptions of Organizational Justice and Ambivalent Sexism: The Moderating Role of Individualism-Collectivism, 35 REVISTA DE PSICOLOGÍA 31, 52 (2017).
254. Henle & Naude, supra note 183, at 155.
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the appraisal process increases justice perceptions—even if their
resulting performance review is negative.255
But transparency is not always simple. Scholars have been
quick to critique transparency, especially where it is valorized in
the abstract or where its unintended consequences are not fully
appreciated.256 Consider applicants who are rejected for a job.
On the one hand, information that is provided to applicants may
enhance fairness perceptions and could make them less likely to
sue;257 indeed, the strength of this effect has been shown to apply
to applicants with both positive and negative outcomes.258 On
the other hand, human resource professionals are almost always
counseled not to give applicants specific reasons for the decision
because the reason provided could intensify the feelings they
have about being rejected.259 So, if the applicants object to the
specific explanation, it could make them even more likely to
sue.260 In this specific context, there are risks either way, but it
stands to reason that providing some explanation can give the
company greater control over the situation. In short, transparency can foster both justice and justice perceptions, even if the
road to organizational transparency is sometimes a bumpy one.
2. Accountability
At the outset, it is worth noting that accountability can flow
naturally from transparency. For example, when an employer is
transparent about its decision-making processes or compensation structure, it can cause other employees or third parties to
seek justice. In one field study, a firm had a discriminatory record of giving black workers smaller raises than white workers

255. Shapiro & Sherf, supra note 238, at 453.
256. See Fenster, supra note 243, at 885 (arguing that open government laws
have failed to achieve transparency in part because in “relying on the assumptions of ‘transparency,’ they typically operate at exceptionally high levels of abstraction”); David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100
(2018) (illustrating, through historical examples, how transparency has no set
political valence).
257. Truxillo et al., supra note 238, at 632 (citing various studies for this
proposition).
258. Id.
259. E.g., Paula Ancona, Part of Hiring Is Telling Others They Didn’t Get
Job, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1991, at 5.
260. Providing explanations to unsuccessful candidates would run afoul of
the conventional advice for human resource professionals. E.g., id. (“Don’t feel
obligated to give specific reasons for not choosing an applicant.”).
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with equal performance scores.261 The researcher then had the
firm post each unit’s average performance rating and average
pay raise by race and gender.262 Once decision-makers knew that
internal constituencies were watching, the pay gap nearly disappeared overnight;263 transparency mediated by accountability
produced a more just result.
In this Section I am focused on something slightly different:
how creating formal structures of accountability endogenous to
the workplace can produce just outcomes. Social psychologists
have focused on accountability in the specific area of antidiscrimination and diversity. Empirical research demonstrates that
when decision-makers are enlisted in problem-solving, it has
much better returns on actually increasing managerial diversity.264 In this way, structural accountability can both increase
the perception that hiring and promotion is just, and produce
outcomes that reflect a just state of affairs.
One specific example of structural accountability is corporate diversity task forces. The initial idea is to invite department
heads to volunteer265—not compel anyone’s participation—to
participate in a committee formulated around a charge of corporate diversity.266 Once composed, task force members periodically review diversity numbers for the company, determine
which departments need attention, and brainstorm solutions to
achieve their diversity-based goals.267 Other examples of structural accountability include diversity staff positions, such as a
diversity manager, and mentoring and training programs that
pair existing managers with people from different demographic
groups who hope to ascend the ranks of management.268 While
most of the EEO policies that companies have implemented to
spur justice in the form of diversity and antidiscrimination have
261. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 13, at 58.
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing study).
264. GREEN, supra note 13, at 136–38; Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge,
supra note 14, at 52 (observing that the “antidiscrimination measures that work
best are those that engage decision makers in solving the problem themselves”);
Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 58; Fujimoto et al., supra note
211, at 159.
265. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 58.
266. See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the importance of freedom of choice).
267. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 58.
268. See generally Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14 (discussing these examples); Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14 (same);
Fujimoto et al., supra note 211 (same); Kalev et al., supra note 182 (same).
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“failed spectacularly,” structural accountability, as embodied in
diversity task forces, diversity staff positions, mentoring programs, and management training, has been effective as an empirical matter.269
The general success of structural accountability stems from
several basic phenomena. First, these programs all facilitate
contact among women, racial minorities, and white men—some
of whom might not otherwise interact.270 This contact alone is
valuable in mitigating the effects of in-group preference and because it further humanizes people who might be seen as different. Second, these programs will naturally enlist people who
might otherwise not care about diversity, but who enjoy solving
problems and have access to resources, such as time, money, and
personnel.271 Building broader coalitions of these kinds is critical
to fighting discrimination.272 Third, having policies and people
in place that foster corporate accountability helps to actually
halt some amount of discrimination. The studies on accountability are clear that people are less likely to exercise bias when they
expect their decisions will be reviewed.273 Curbing discrimination frequently takes purposeful effort, and structural accountability makes it much more likely that people will be self-conscious enough to make that purposeful effort. In sum,
accountability is one of the most promising values for ensuring
justice due in part to its demonstrated potential to deter discrimination in the managerial ranks.

269. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 60. For example, companies that implemented diversity task forces have seen increases of 9% to 30%
in the representation of white women and racial minority group members in
management over the next five years. Id.
270. See Jared B. Kenworthy et al., Intergroup Contact: When Does It Work
and Why?, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 279
(John Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) (noting the elements of “remedial contact” as
involving equal status, common goals, institutional support, and a perception of
similarity between the two groups); Chad Trulson & James M. Marquart, The
Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 L. & SOC’Y REV. 743, 745 (2002) (discussing the contact
hypothesis).
271. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Fail, supra note 14, at 60; Fujimoto et al.,
supra note 211, at 159.
272. See Lisa Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1476 (profiling aggressive campaigns to stamp out bias and showing that such strategies are prone to elicit “a
reflexive, reactive effect that increase[s] prejudice”).
273. GREEN, supra note 13, at 137.
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3. Freedom of Choice
Whether it is wellness programs, diversity training, or committee assignments, employees’ freedom to choose will dramatically influence how they will feel about the activity. This feeling
stems from what behavioral economists call a “choice-supportive
bias,” in which people tend to feel positively about the things
they have chosen and less positively about things they have not
chosen.274 Similarly, people often rebel against perceived efforts
to control them.275 When employees are free to choose, they are
more likely to feel that the resulting state of affairs is a just
one.276 Simply put, there is a clearly defined relationship both
between choice and fairness as well as one between no choice and
unfairness.277
The potential problem with freedom of choice is that an employer will naturally tend to direct the activities of its employees
when they are at work. The employer may need one employee on
a particular committee, feel it is necessary for another employee
to attend diversity training, or expect a third employee to participate fully in the wellness program. Nevertheless, behavioral science on the topic of choice is clear: failure to give employees a
choice about whether to participate will make them feel worse

274. See Kristen Stoll Benney & Linda A. Henkel, The Role of Free Choice in
Memory for Past Decisions, 14 MEMORY 1001, 1002 (2006) (recounting studies
that validate “choice-supportive memory distortion”).
275. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50; see, e.g.,
GREEN, supra note 13, at 114 (noting that “requiring supervisors to rely on detailed rubrics for selecting promotion candidates can backfire as managers rebel
against perceived bureaucratic control”).
276. See Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50–51;
Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1476 (observing that workplace interventions
that eliminate choice “may incite hostility toward the perceived source of the
pressure”).
277. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, Facilitating Optimal Motivation and Psychological Well-Being Across Life’s Domains, 49 CANADIAN PSYCHOL. 14, 19 (2008) (summarizing a variety of field experiments in which the
autonomy of employees was predictive of their trust in the organization). The
importance of choice also helps explain the robust literature that has developed
around nudges over the last twenty years. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle
Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
607, 607–08 (2000) (arguing lawmakers can use nudges to overcome the difficulty of changing social norms); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1829–36 (2013) (arguing
market failures justify legal paternalism in the form of nudging).
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about the organization.278 If “you catch more flies with honey
than vinegar,” perceived choice is honey to employees, making
them more likely to embrace whatever decision or task it is they
have selected.
The issue of choice is so important that even policies that
are intended to help employees can feel unjust if the workers do
not perceive an option regarding whether to participate. Take
wellness programs, for example. An employer-provided wellness
plan is a programmatic effort to encourage employees to make
healthier choices.279 But when wellness programs are required,
or the financial incentive to participate is too substantial to pass
up, workers resist.280 Even if the incentive ought to rationally
compel everyone to participate and achieve better health, some
will inevitably feel that a wellness plan is overbearing or unjust.281

278. Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50 (“Job-autonomy research finds that people resist external controls on their thoughts and
behavior and perform poorly in their jobs when they lack autonomy.”).
279. Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May
Undermine Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 101, 102 (2017).
Wellness programs implement various strategies, such as individual and group
challenges, that promote healthy behaviors and produce a “positive herd mentality.” Jessica L. Roberts, Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice and the Ethics of
Nudging, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (2018).
280. In fact, a group of older workers who were concerned largely about privacy and civil rights challenged the amount of incentive (30% of the cost of coverage under the plan) that was allowed under the EEOC’s regulations sanctioning voluntary wellness programs. AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 37
(D.D.C. 2017), on reconsideration, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D.D.C. 2017). The EEOC
officially rescinded these regulations, which had expressly permitted the voluntary incentive of up to 30%, in December of 2018. Ryan Golden, EEOC Rescinds
Wellness Regulations Ahead of Sunset Date, HR DIVE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://
www.hrdive.com/news/eeoc-rescinds-wellness-regulations-ahead-of-sunset
-date/544866/ [https://perma.cc/E9DH-G4FW].
281. See, e.g., Press Release, AARP, Statement by AARP Exec. Vice President Nancy LeaMond on EEOC Workplace Wellness Program Rules (May 16,
2016), https://press.aarp.org/2016-05-16-Statement-by-AARP-EVP-Nancy
-LeaMond-on-EEOC-Workplace-Wellness-Program-Rules [https://perma.cc/
2CT4-C7Y5] (“Older workers in particular are more likely to have the very types
of less visible medical conditions and disabilities—such as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer—that are at risk of disclosure by wellness questionnaires and
exams. By financially coercing employees into surrendering their personal
health information, these rules will weaken medical privacy and civil rights protections.”).
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Consider, as well, the idea of diversity training. Diversity
training may intuitively seem as though it can produce both justice and perceptions of justice. After all, such trainings often help
employees value difference and, when done well, can foster the
sentiment that each employee is uniquely valuable and worthy
of equitable treatment. Nonetheless, mandatory diversity training—a common stratagem—is unhelpful.282 Not only is such
training generally unsuccessful in broadening perspectives,283 it
also causes majority group members to fear they will be treated
unfairly.284 In short, mandating participation or involvement
can cause employees to resist, undercutting their sense that the
workplace is fair; in contrast, allowing employees to select their
involvement in non-essential policies or programs is a low-cost
way of furthering an organizationally just climate.
B. IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE
This Article’s contention is that legal and policy mandates
have failed to effectively deter discrimination—and in part for
this reason, we must consider alternative, non-coercive approaches.285 One might then naturally wonder: what exactly can
be done to ensure and measure Organizational Justice? As explained above, it is beyond the scope of this Article to detail particular policies that ought to be adopted by all employers.286
While the values set out in the previous section lay the groundwork for the types of policies that will further justice in the workplace, they do not tell any particular actor what specifically to
282. See Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 52 (“Employers mandate training in the belief that people hostile to the message will
not attend voluntarily, but if we are right, forcing them to come will do more
harm than good.”).
283. See id. at 49 (showing through a meta-analysis of 426 studies on antibias training that any effects were weak and dissipated within days).
284. Id. at 50 (noting “[w]hites generally feel they will not be treated fairly
in workplaces” that emphasize or compel diversity).
285. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 15, at 1903 (showing aggressive legal
strategies may backfire when it comes to implicit bias); Eyer, supra note 9, at
1279–80 (noting proposals to broaden the legal doctrines of antidiscrimination
laws may “exacerbate the documented tensions between prevailing public views
and available claims”); Legault et al., supra note 15, at 1476 (demonstrating
“that strategies urging people to comply with antiprejudice standards are worse
than doing nothing at all” and that “social control elicited a reflexive, reactive
effect that increased prejudice”).
286. Supra notes 238–41 (explaining why it might be unhelpful to gin up a
“list of ready to go, discrete measures that can be implemented across all organizations”).
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do. Nevertheless, this Section will consider the relative merits of
pay transparency. Additionally, Organizational Justice provides
important clues about how employers may be persuaded to create more just workplace climates.
1. Firm Interest
An indispensable part of educating employers must involve
convincing them that it is in their own best interest to make
workplaces more just. Fortunately, there is compelling evidence
that policies advancing justice perceptions not only serve the
public interest, but also the interests of the firm; evidence indicates that an organizationally just climate increases retention,
efficiency, and productivity.287 But why exactly do just organizations advance the bottom line?
The answer lies at least partly in social exchange theory, in
which parties calculate how to behave toward one another in
light of the anticipated costs and benefits.288 In the work context,
there is evidence that when individuals “receive economic and
socioemotional resources from their organization, they feel
obliged to respond in kind and repay the organization.”289 In particular, one of the most profound ways for an employee to respond to an organization is to vary their level of engagement and
job performance.290 When the engagement is high, an employee
will devote greater amounts of cognitive, emotional, and physical
resources to their job.291
One of the many social exchanges or inputs that can influence employees is perceived fairness in managerial practices.
Fair treatment signifies respect and communicates support for
employees.292 Thus, when employees perceive an organization’s
287. E.g., Andrew Li et al., Fairness at the Unit Level: Justice Climate, Justice Climate Strength, and Peer Justice, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN
THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at 137; Devon Proudfoot & E. Allan Lind, Fairness Heuristic Theory, the Uncertainty Management Model, and Fairness at
Work, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 19, at
371.
288. Social Exchange Theory, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Social_exchange_theory [https://perma.cc/GS6M-P8TY].
289. Alan M. Saks, Antecedents and Consequences of Employee Engagement,
21 J. MANAG. PSYCH. 600, 603 (2006).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Gauri S. Rai, Organizational Justice and Quality of Working Life: A
Road That Leads to a Virtuous Organization, 41 J. SOC. SERV. RES. 269, 287
(2015).
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management and policies are just or fair, they reciprocate or repay the employer with better job performance and commitment.293 The logical extension of such repayment is greater
productivity, and less absenteeism and turnover.294 As such,
there are profit-serving reasons for employers to actively seek
justice in the workplace.
2. Educating Employers
Employers must also be educated about the antidiscrimination benefits of an organizationally just climate, and advocacy
groups are likely in the best position to do that work. In particular, advocacy groups might develop specific policy recommendations that are based upon empirical evidence and urge employers
to adopt them.295 In the current political climate, we see instances of this already happening. One example is the National
Women’s Law Center, which has effectively pressured employers
to adopt reforms in the areas of fairer work schedules, pay equity, and sexual harassment.296 In the Organizational Justice
space, human resource professionals and organizations like the
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) are likely the
most effective actors to transmit justice-laden, workplace reforms to the national business community.297 As alluded to already, one of the possible benefits to Organizational Justice is
293. Cho, supra note 228, at 177; see supra note 287.
294. Rai, supra note 292, at 287.
295. Sturm, supra note 53, at 463, 520–21, 565.
296. See Workplace, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., https://nwlc.org/issue/
workplace/ [https://perma.cc/FH9V-CPMG] (providing an overview of their advocacy efforts); see, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., NWLC Calls To
Investigate Sexual Assault Allegations Against Justin Fairfax (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://nwlc.org/press-releases/nwlc-calls-to-investigate-sexual-assault
-allegations-against-justin-fairfax/ [https://perma.cc/R2AH-2UJF]; Press Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., NWLC Applauds Introduction of the Raise the
Wage Act (Jan. 16, 2019), https://nwlc.org/press-releases/nwlc-applauds
-introduction-of-the-raise-the-wage-act/ [https://perma.cc/786Z-WQPL]; Press
Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Wage Gap for Women Does Not Budge for
Two Years in a Row, Being a Woman Still Increases the Odds of Being Poor in
America, and Number of People Insured Holds Steady (Sept. 12, 2018), https://
nwlc.org/press-releases/wage-gap-women-does-not-budge-being-woman
-increases-odds-of-being-poor-america/ [https://perma.cc/27G9-58FN]; Press Release, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Walmart Must Face Pregnancy Discrimination
Class Action (Mar. 29, 2018), https://nwlc.org/press-releases/walmart-must
-face-pregnancy-discrimination-class-action/ [https://perma.cc/7J3E-EART].
297. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., https://www.shrm.org [https://
perma.cc/G2GG-M3TC].
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that it is a broad enough frame to serve the interests of diverse
constituencies, such as groups advocating on behalf of women,
racial minorities, and the LGBTQ community. More than that,
justice is a “big tent” that even majority group members can get
behind—especially when the justice-oriented policies are identity-neutral. In this way, the research on Organizational Justice
provides a way to transcend the culture wars—after all, who’s
opposed to justice?—and still seek change in the workplace that
will benefit disadvantaged populations the most.298
Employers could likely be persuaded, based upon the data
marshalled by this Article, that Organizational Justice is a useful approach to a seemingly intractable set of problems flowing
from bias and patterns of discrimination. In particular, Organizational Justice offers two prime advantages as a tool of antidiscrimination. First, and most fundamentally, Organizational Justice intervenes before people engage in discrimination. This early
stage of intervention means that it targets both conscious and
unconscious biases,299 and that it can deter the exercise of bias
before people are actually injured. By preventing discrimination,
Organizational Justice avoids altogether such cognitive barriers
as disbelieving discrimination or an unwillingness to label behavior as “harassment.”
Legal scholars are often fixated on whether antidiscrimination laws are “working,” by which we mean that people can sue,
survive summary judgment, and prevail upon their claims. But
securing settlements or winning lawsuits is not the goal of antidiscrimination laws—the point is to reduce or even prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place. Further to the
point, most plaintiffs do not want a lawsuit; they want to not
experience discrimination.300 Given the data showing that Organizational Justice can help deter discrimination, employers
ought to embrace strategies that maximize justice.
Second, Organizational Justice advances nondiscrimination
in a way that avoids the usual detriments that accompany explicit efforts to address bias for a whole host of reasons.301 As
298. See supra Part II.A (discussing how workplace injustices disproportionately impact women and racial minorities).
299. Cf. Roberts, supra note 178, at 2155 (making a similar argument about
privacy).
300. Thanks to Katie Eyer for raising several of these incisive points.
301. See supra notes 64–68, 220, 282–84 and infra note 325 and accompanying text (detailing the various ways in which industry efforts to advance diversity or address bias have failed).
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noted in the introduction, strategies such as diversity or antibias
training may have perverse effects, such as activating stereotypes, increasing “moral licensing,” and undermining people’s
senses of “autonomy, competence, relatedness, and basic goodness”—causing such programs to backfire.302 Organizational
Justice thus offers a menu of “cooler” policies that can operate in
the background and foster justice without generating the animosity that can sometimes undermine progress for disadvantaged groups.303
3. Measuring Success
A critical piece in implementing Organizational Justice involves measuring success. One might naturally wonder how an
employer will know when it has achieved a more just climate.
One way to measure Organizational Justice is to systematically
and periodically survey employees on measures of distributive,
procedural, and informational justice. There are a number of empirical studies on Organizational Justice that provide a window
into the types of questions one might raise. For example, consider the statements and questions in Figure 1 (below), taken
from a study on managerial efforts to establish fair practices.
The statements and questions are non-exhaustive, but provide a
useful starting point in considering how employers might attempt to measure change in the amount of perceived justice
within an organization.

302. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
303. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1361 (advocating a “‘cooler’ approach—by its nature designed to avoid the pursuit of moral victories” as the best means to “improv[e] outcomes for individual victims of discrimination”).
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Figure 1.
Survey Questions and Statements that Measure the Managerial Dimension of Organizational Justice304
Distributive justice
•
•
•

Promotions in my work unit are based on merit.
Pay raises depend on how well employees perform their
jobs.
Awards in my work unit depend on how well employees
perform their jobs.

Procedural justice
•
•
•
•

Complaints, disputes, or grievances are resolved fairly in
my work unit.
Arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and coercion for
partisan political purposes are not tolerated.
Prohibited personnel practices are not tolerated.
I can disclose a suspected violation of any law, rule, or
regulation without fear of reprisal.

Informational justice
•
•

•

Managers communicate the goals and priorities of the organization.
Managers promote communication among different work
units (for example, about projects, goals, needed resources).
How satisfied are you with the information you receive
from management on what’s going on in your organization?

One might naturally question whether there is a problematic tension between what people perceive as just and what is
actually just.305 For example, one might perceive that a state of
affairs is just, but in fact it is not. Conversely, an unfair situation
may be overlooked or go unrecognized. This is a natural tension
between certain sub-species of organizational justice. For example, there might not be distributive justice (by any reasonable
measure), but an organizational environment might be high on
procedural justice, producing a general perception of fairness.
The question is ultimately not whether there is true justice, in

304. Cho, supra note 228, at 181.
305. Of course, this concern begs the question of what one might consider to
be true or actual justice—or how we might measure it. “Justice” is both a
fraught and contested term.
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some epistemic sense, but whether people within an organization believe there is justice across distributive, procedural, and
informational factors. Organizational Justice cannot solve all
problems, which may include not producing actual justice in
some instances. Even so, this Article has contended that procedural justice is often a strong start toward the justice produced
by successful antidiscrimination efforts. Procedural justice can,
as explained in Part II, prevent discrimination and increase internal reports of harassment in many instances.
4. An Example: Pay Transparency
One specific policy extension of Organizational Justice is
found in making wages more transparent. In recent years, there
has been a push by both politicians and activists for mandated
pay transparency.306 The basic idea is that Congress could pass
an omnibus federal law that requires employers to make wages
more transparent and provide better remedies and protections
for employees who oppose pay discrimination.307 But Organizational Justice may be challenging to achieve through legal mandates of this sort.308 Many state entities are already required by

306. The Paycheck Fairness Act, which would require employers to make
wages more transparent and prohibit retaliation for employees who raise concerns about discriminatory compensation, has been reintroduced in every Congress dating back to 1997. Paycheck Fairness Act, WIKIPEDIA, https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paycheck_Fairness_Act [https://perma.cc/FM8N-NVUK].
For more analysis on the merits of pay transparency, see BERREY ET AL., supra
note 42, at 272 (arguing for a system of mandated disclosure of demographic
and wage data) and Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 781 (2014) (analyzing
the potential costs and benefits of pay transparency and concluding, on balance,
that such transparency would result in a fairer and less discriminatory economy).
307. Paycheck Fairness Act, supra note 306.
308. This Article has contended that coercive approaches to addressing discrimination have generally been unsuccessful and are not the best path forward.
Supra Part I (discussing the failure of antidiscrimination law); see also supra
notes 283–84 and infra note 325 and accompanying text (discussing the failure
of EEO policies that require employees to do something). The approach of simply
trying to legislate change evokes the “Law of the Instrument,” under which people tend to rely on familiar instruments in lieu of searching out the best tools
for intractable problems. See generally Law of the Instrument, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_the_instrument [https://perma.cc/8S9C
-YWLN]. Since point source-style legislation has been generally ineffective, we
ought to instead focus on seeking justice in the workplace by attacking discrimination indirectly.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3585389

1980

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:1921

law to disclose salary information to the public. A public employee may be more likely to see this disclosure as legal compliance than as evidence that their employer is particularly just.
A more tailored approach would be the rule that President
Obama advanced in 2016, requiring companies with 100 or more
employees to report their pay scales broken down by sex and
race.309 The EEOC has always required large companies to report the job titles of their workers by sex and race; Obama simply
expanded these existing requirements to include pay data. Nonetheless, the rule was subsequently stayed by the Trump Administration.310 In March of 2019, a federal judge gave the proposed
rule life again, finding that the stay was unwarranted and that
the pay scale disclosure rule could go forward.311 But critics have
argued that this rule does not go far enough because the data
will only be disclosed to regulators and not the public.312
A more promising, and less coercive, alternative would be
for federal or state legislatures to create economic incentives. For
example, instead of legislating pay transparency, Congress could
craft tax inducements for companies that make compensation
data publicly available. This might accomplish less overall transparency, but it would increase the likelihood that something actually gets passed. After all, few companies currently provide
pay transparency,313 which suggests they would prefer not to do
309. Daniel Wiessner, Judge Says Trump Administration Improperly
Blocked Sex, Race Pay Data Rule, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2019, 10:57 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lawsuit-paydata/judge-says-trump
-administration-improperly-blocked-sex-race-pay-data-rule-idUSKCN1QM224
[https://perma.cc/65NE-NK8D].
310. Id.
311. Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d
66, 71 (D.D.C. 2019).
312. Employers Must Now Release Data To Close Race-Gender Pay Gap,
NPR (Sept. 30, 2019), https://one.npr.org/?sharedMediaId=765674633:
765685778.
313. Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26
BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 47–48 (2005). Some companies, such as Whole Foods
and Verve, have taken the step of voluntarily adopting salary transparency policies, but they are in the extreme minority of companies. See Kim Elsesser, Pay
Transparency Is the Solution to the Pay Gap: Here’s One Company’s Success
Story, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kimelsesser/2018/09/05/pay-transparency-is-the-solution-to-the-pay-gap-heres
-one-companys-success-story/#684959350100 [https://perma.cc/3YFW-SX2X]
(discussing Verve’s policy); Tanza Loudenback, More Tech Companies Have
Stopped Keeping Employee Salaries Secret—And They’re Seeing Results, BUS.
INSIDER (May 3, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/why
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so.314 Coaxing—instead of mandating—pay transparency would
also engender less resentment from the business community and
those on the high end of the salary scale, whose salaries are most
likely to be affected, by disguising the prod as a carrot. It is also
more likely that employees will admire such a step if it is not
taken under the duress of legal mandate.
Still, to talk about justice flowing from pay transparency is
complicated. Transparency in earnings would certainly give employees a chance to assess whether they are victims of pay discrimination, which could also deter future sex- or race-based
compensation disparities.315 However, laying bare employment
compensation in the private sector would also cause jealousy and
resentment—at least in the short term.316 It could even elevate
the overall amount of felt injustice,317 especially since wage compression is often a byproduct of salaries being made public.318
However, the argument about transparency’s effect on justice
perceptions is knotty. To answer that question, one would have
to counter-factualize how employees will feel after learning actual salaries and compare that information to what they currently suspect or fear.319 Perceptions of injustice could be greater
under the current, more secretive state of affairs.320
All told, the argument that pay transparency would increase
justice through antidiscrimination is compelling. Some commentators have even argued that pay transparency is the most direct
route to closing the gender wage gap.321 After all, when salaries
-companies-have-open-salaries-and-pay-transparency-2017-4/commerce-on
-business-insider [https://perma.cc/4H2G-KDXR] (discussing Whole Foods’ policy).
314. See Estlund, supra note 306, at 791–99 (canvassing employer objections
to pay transparency).
315. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A MarketBased Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 951, 982–1006 (2011)
(making this case); Estlund, supra note 306, at 786.
316. Estlund, supra note 306, at 797.
317. The impact of pay transparency on perceptions of fairness is mixed. Id.
at 794 n.72.
318. Id. at 795–96.
319. Id. at 794.
320. Id.
321. Elsesser, supra note 313 (touting pay transparency as the solution to
the pay gap); Kristin Wong, Want To Close the Pay Gap? Pay Transparency Will
Help, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/
smarter-living/pay-wage-gap-salary-secrecy-transparency.html [https://perma
.cc/B3T6-MMZW].
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are kept secret, pay inequity between sexes or races is typically
undetectable. Countries such as Denmark and Britain have
found that pay transparency reduced the gender wage gap in
part by slowing men’s salary growth and in part by compressing
employees’ wages.322 In the United States, both unions and the
public sector—where compensation is typically transparent and
reveals smaller disparities between different races and sexes—
provides more evidence of this relationship.323 Moreover, a pay
scale disclosure rule would give the public access to industrywide phenomena—data that could arm victims of wage discrimination with robust evidence for litigation.324 The issue of pay
transparency is just one example of an Organizational Justiceminded policy, and it illustrates how an employer can increase
justice, and fight discrimination, without hewing to the wellworn and frequently ineffectual EEO industry path.325
C. Addressing Counter-Arguments and Concerns
One general argument that might be leveled against Organizational Justice is that it is just another form of “new governance,” in which organizations are encouraged to self-govern in
322. Bryce Covert, Even Google Can No Longer Hide Its Gender Pay Gap,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/07/opinion/google
-pay-gap.html [https://perma.cc/4GK6-ZYBV].
323. Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043,
1063 (2012) (“Pay transparency is more common in state employment and at
unionized workplaces than in non-unionized private employment, and many
studies have documented reduced wage disparities on the basis of race and gender in such workplaces.”).
324. Covert, supra note 322.
325. EEO policies such as those installing diversity task forces or EEO offices are understandable courses of action. But scholars have documented that
many such policies are ineffective, or worse, counterproductive. First, they often
fail to increase the raw number of women and racial minorities in the workplace
and/or in management positions. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 137. Second, if
the policies require that employees attend certain meetings or make certain decisions, employees may react negatively to what they perceive as attempts to
control them. See Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50.
Third, if the policies prod managers to prefer groups that have been historically
excluded, that pressure may cause majority group members to feel sidelined and
undervalued. Id. Finally, if the policies are built around reducing bias, they will
likely activate and reinforce stereotypes by increasing their cognitive availability. Kalev et al., supra note 182, at 593 (citing studies for this proposition); see
also Dobbin & Kalev, Diversity Challenge, supra note 14, at 50 (“Try not thinking about elephants. Diversity training typically encourages people to recognize
and fight the stereotypes they hold, and this may simply be counterproductive.”).
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lieu of top-down regulation.326 Some legal scholars have noted
the utility of governance-based approaches to social issues. For
example, Cynthia Estlund has observed that the turn to governance is a by-product of two realities: that “powerful dynamics
and incentives operating within regulated organizations and
networks can either frustrate or advance societal objectives; and
that direct regulation is not always the best way of channeling
those organizational dynamics in a socially productive direction.”327 But others have argued against governance-based approaches, worrying that organizations will engage in a type of
symbolic compliance that treats legal objectives as business
goals instead of moral imperatives.328 These arguments have
merit and warrant response. In the civil rights context, the argument against new governance can be distilled into three risks:
(1) the risk that without legal enforcement, businesses will not
self-police; (2) the risk that the policies employers choose will be
ineffective; and (3) the risk that such policies will “managerialize” moral imperatives.329
One concern with “new governance” policies is that when
employers are not forced to act, they may well do nothing. First,
as detailed above, advancing justice simultaneously advances
the firm’s interest through increasing the level of employees’ engagement, which in turn, can increase workplace efficiency and
reduce workplace absenteeism and turnover. The empirical data
is strong that just organizations persuade employees to remain
loyal and engage in productive behaviors. Moreover, as discussed
in Part II, policies that foster justice can decrease discrimination
and increase the representation of disadvantaged constituencies, which in turn may help organizations rightly avoid legal
liability.330 Organizational Justice is thus a partial answer to legal scholars like Susan Sturm and Tristen Green, who have
called for organizations to get more creative in devising solutions
that minimize discrimination and further the promotion of

326. E.g., EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 223 (expressing skepticism about
more organizational self-governance).
327. Estlund, supra note 249, at 404.
328. Id.
329. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 223 (worrying about the tendency to “managerialize the law in ways that render it more consistent with business goals
and less consistent with legal goals”).
330. Supra Part II.B.
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women and minorities.331 Ultimately, as noted above, justice can
be a powerful framing device, making Organizational Justice
both a politically and socially agreeable means of furthering antisubordination.332
A second argument against “new governance” approaches is
that the policies a business enacts such as grievance procedures
or diversity trainings may turn out to be wholly ineffective, and
yet the organization is nonetheless credited by courts and the
public as being attentive to antidiscrimination values.333 Scholars have argued that the presence of symbolic structures may
have an “anchoring effect” for judges: once they learn that these
structures are in place, they are more likely to form an initial
assessment that the employer is complying with civil rights laws
and are less likely to give weight to subsequent evidence showing
otherwise.334 One elegant feature of Organizational Justice is
that it does not directly relate to discrimination and is thus not
an obvious EEO reform. Accordingly, judges would be unlikely
to deem reforms flowing from a commitment to fairness as relevant to antidiscrimination litigation. Further, any time an organization installs policies—of any kind—they may turn out to
be ineffective. But all of these facts form an argument in favor of
distinguishing between those policies that achieve substantive
justice versus those that are merely symbolic—not an argument
against implementing justice-oriented reforms altogether.335
A third possible concern is that Organizational Justice may
function as a shortcut around bias in which the moral focus on
eliminating prejudice gets lost. The idea is that indirect approaches can minimize the “moral valence” of fighting discrimination.336 For example, instead of using their inherent influence
331. GREEN, supra note 13, at 154–55 (calling for organizations to be more
creative in devising solutions to reduce discrimination); Sturm, supra note 53,
at 463 (encouraging “experimentation with respect to information gathering,
organizational design, incentive structures, measures of effectiveness, and
methods of institutionalizing accountability as part of an explicit system of legal
regulation”).
332. Supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
333. EDELMAN, supra note 41, at 223.
334. Id. at 171.
335. See id. at 238 (acknowledging that when legal institutions actually “distinguish between organizational practices that are substantive and those that
are merely symbolic . . . legal endogeneity promotes social change”).
336. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1356 (considering the “lost moral valence of moving away from claims of discrimination towards an increased focus on claims”
that are “designed to be less morally and socially charged”). Cf. Roberts, supra
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to act on a positive moral duty, organizations may relegate such
duties to policy; that is, they create a space for antidiscrimination apart from appreciating it as a moral imperative. The best
response to this argument is that employment discrimination
law as currently constituted offers few victories—moral, economic, or otherwise.337 Given that most legal policies are failing
to combat discrimination, innovative approaches to furthering
antidiscrimination should be embraced—even while advocates
simultaneously campaign for legal reform. Additionally, as explained above, most policy efforts that are focused directly on
bias are, according to empirical research, failing.338 More to the
point, organizations could still adopt Organizational Justice reforms with antidiscrimination goals in mind—and an awareness
that traditional civil rights reforms have not worked. Organizational Justice need not signal a lack of commitment to fighting
discrimination, and indeed could become a hallmark of commitment to antidiscrimination values if it comes to be seen as more
effective.339 Accordingly, employers should be quick to adopt and
embrace policies that can further substantive equality—and
benefit both worker and firm alike—through an emphasis on justice.
CONCLUSION
Workplace discrimination is persistent, and current employment discrimination law and policy do not sufficiently address
it. The best available evidence shows that most people who are
discriminated against at work do not file discrimination claims
due to a variety of psychological, social, and pragmatic factors.
Furthermore, even when people do file claims, most are never
fully litigated, and employers win most of the small percentage
that are. To address the shortcomings of antidiscrimination law,
activists need new tools to prevent and reduce discrimination.
Recent empirical studies have shown that Organizational Justice may be just the type of meaningful solution needed. Organizational Justice presents an innovative framework for remaking
note 178, at 2171–72 (acknowledging that privacy may preempt discrimination
“without thinking deeply about the meaning of difference and the values we
may attach to it”).
337. Eyer, supra note 9, at 1356.
338. Supra notes 64–68, 220, 282–84, 325 and accompanying text (detailing
the various ways in which industry efforts to advance diversity or address bias
have failed).
339. Thanks to Katie Eyer for this great insight.
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the workplace climate with an eye toward enhancing fairness in
the workplace. Perhaps most importantly, where current employment discrimination law and policy’s focus is backward—on
righting wrongs already done—Organizational Justice aims forward to stop discrimination before it even begins, by addressing
one of its underlying causes.
Organizational Justice is a useful addition to the antidiscrimination toolbox. An organizationally just climate can both
decrease discrimination and moderate its effects—especially
with regard to women and minorities, who are disproportionately harmed by workplace discrimination. Organizational Justice can also help to decrease instances of harassment in the
workplace and, in the event that harassment still occurs, can increase the likelihood a victim will report it.
With a problem as complicated as discrimination, there are
no easy solutions. Employers should take proactive steps to increase employees’ perceptions of justice through implementing
policies that focus on transparency, accountability, and freedom
of choice. Crafting policies, practices, and rules with a bent toward fostering justice and perceptions of justice may be just the
innovative, heterodox approach needed for more adequately addressing employment discrimination.
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